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Abstract 
Barcarena, a city located in the Brazilian Amazon, was a small town until the 
1970’s, but a massive aluminium production plant was built in the region in 
the 1980’s and the alumina and primary aluminium plants were responsible for 
a drastic economic shift from agriculture to industry. The Brazilian company 
Vale was the major shareholder of the production chain until 2011, when it 
sold its shares to Norwegian Hydro. The plants caused serious environmental 
problems, while not contributing sufficiently to the socio-economic 
development of local people. Following a serious environmental accident in 
Barcarena, the local prosecutor in charge demanded compensation to be paid 
partly in the form of capacity building of the local communities. The purpose 
of this explanatory case study is to understand how this came about, and what 
was the effect on the power of local communities, as stakeholders, to gain 
voice and influence. In order to support my analysis, this study uses 
Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Social Responsibility literature to establish 
a conceptual framework. The primary data gathered during fieldwork in Brazil 
was collected through qualitative methods, such as elite interviews with 
NGOs, Hydro and municipal government and semi structured interviews with 
community leaders. 
Keywords:  CSR, local stakeholder, capacity building, development 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Question and Context Background 
This thesis is a case study on local communities as stakeholders regarding 
Corporate Social Responsibility of the Norwegian company Hydro’s 
aluminium production chain in the Brazilian Amazon. The aim of this research 
is to understand how and why local communities seem to be gaining more 
power to influence Hydro in Barcarena and how social and environmental 
factors contributed to this scenario. In addition to that, the thesis discusses 
what the local communities expect from the corporation. 
This is a study about local people living in a small town in the relatively 
isolated region of Northern Brazil which was turned into the core of a 
billionaire aluminium production chain in the 1980’s. Back then, the Brazilian 
government had launched a program of incentives to bring industry activities 
to the Amazon region. Among the aspects that motivated the plan, was the 
world oil crisis which increased the price of aluminium - especially in Japan, a 
major consumer of aluminium. Japanese investors joined the Brazilian 
program with the Albras project (primary aluminium plant) and some years 
later, Brazilian Vale invested in the Alunorte project (alumina plant), two 
integrated industries in Barcarena. The Albras/Alunorte complex is still the 
biggest industry in the municipality by far (total revenue of US$ 2.4 billion in 
2011). 
However, the new business implied serious risk to the local ecosystem. As the 
first stage of the production chain, the industrial plant of Alunorte generates 
alumina from bauxite using the Bayer process1. The main residual component 
of this process is called red mud, which cannot be disposed easily and is 
                                              
1 “The Bayer refining process used by alumina refineries worldwide involves four steps - digestion, 
clarification, precipitation and calcination”. Source: Alcoa (www.alcoa.com, accessed in 10/03/2014). 
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normally stored in open pools after some preliminary treatment (Figure 1). In 
fact, there is a risk of contamination from the red mud. In April 2009, there 
was a discharge in the Murucupi River in Barcarena which caught media 
attention and concerned the local community. Researchers of Evandro Chagas 
Institute proved that the red mud accident in the river caused physical and 
chemical changes in the local community source of water and consequently 
environmental impacts and health risks to the population (IEC 2009). The 
second stage of the chain is the production of aluminium by Albras which 
requires a massive amount of water and intense and constant usage of energy. 
In order to fulfil that demand, an area of 2,875 km² was flooded by the 
Tucuruí hydroelectric plant in 1984, causing the expropriation of about 10,000 
families of small farmers and the displacement of indigenous people, such as 
Pacuruí and Parakanã (Wanderley 2004). 
 
Figure 1: Alunorte and Albras plants in Barcarena 
Source: Google Earth 
 
Not only has this led to environmental damage, the development scenario has 
changed Barcarena and failed to result in wealth for local people. Millions of 
dollars and hundreds of workers moved to Barcarena, which used to be known 
by fishery, agricultural and fruit productions like açaí berry, pupunha (palm 
tree) and pineapple. The population growth is clear through the analysis of the 
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official numbers. In the 1970’s the population was 17,498 inhabitants (IBGE 
1970) while in 2013, 109,975 people were living in Barcarena, according to 
local government statistics. Over the last 40 years, the local communities have 
witnessed a social struggle, especially when it comes to the precarious 
sanitation, urban violence, drug trafficking, lack of good housing and 
economic alternatives for the local population.  
Moreover, the business sector complains that the local government is absent, 
instead of investing the taxes paid by the industry in infrastructure and 
environmental regulations. In short, people from Barcarena have been the 
most vulnerable stakeholder of the aluminium complex. 
In contrast to that, there have been two important recent events regarding local 
communities’ power to influence the business (Figure 2). The first one was the 
compliance agreement (Conduct Adjustment Agreement, CAA) elaborated 
after an environmental accident in 2007 by a kaolin2 company affecting a river 
in the Barcarena region. The second important episode was in 2011, when 
Norwegian company Hydro bought the majority of shares of the aluminium 
production chain in Barcarena. 
 
Figure 2: Relevant events in Barcarena 1970-2014 
Source: organized by the author 
                                              
2 Kaolin (also called china clay) is a soft white clay that is the main ingredient in the manufacture of 
porcelain and is widely used in the making of paper, plastics, rubber and paint. 
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The first event was important because CAA document from 2007 included an 
article explaining that the compensation paid by the company should address a 
budget devoted exclusively to a capacity building program of local 
communities. The main goal of this process was to strengthen the political 
capacity of civil society and establish its role in designing future alternatives 
for the municipality. At that time, Brazilian NGO International Institute of 
Brazilian Education (IEB) was brought in to supervise workshops and 
seminars with local community leaders. Some of the topics discussed were 
Sustainable Development, Public Budget and Corporate Communication.  
The second event raised the possibility of changes in Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) regarding the biggest business in town. Since the 
beginning, Brazilian company Vale was the main owner of the aluminium 
production chain. In 2011, Hydro purchased the majority of the Albras 
(51%)/Alunorte (91%)/CAP (81%) complex.  Plus, NGO Norwegian Church 
Aid (NCA) started to act as an additional watchdog3, motivated by the fact that 
Hydro is Norwegian. As reported at NCA website, one of the main focuses of 
the organization is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of Norwegian 
companies around the globe.  
In sum, a new scenario came up with the main actors being: the local 
communities, Hydro, other industries in Barcarena, municipal government, the 
prosecutor and two NGOs, IEB and NCA.  
1.2 Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
The methodology chosen was explanatory case study. A case study is expected 
to grasp the complexity of a single case. Furthermore, a case study investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries 
                                              
3 “Watchdog is a person or a group that monitors the practices of companies providing a particular 
service or utility”. Source: Oxford dictionary (www.oed.com  accessed in 08/05/2014). 
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between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1994:12). 
In order to collect data to explain how local community perceives Hydro CSR, 
I have applied qualitative methods. Qualitative methods include a variety of 
techniques, from participant observation and writing of ethnography, to semi-
structured interviews, oral histories and group discussions (Scheyvens 2003). 
The qualitative approach has tended to focus on one or a small number of 
cases, to use intensive interviews or in-depth analysis of historical material 
(King et al. 1994:4).  
During the fieldwork, I collected both primary and secondary data. Primary 
data is information obtained directly from the researcher’s first-hand sources. 
In this case, primary data was gathered through direct observation in 
Barcarena (Brazil) and during interviews which can be divided in two 
categories: elite interviews with Hydro managers, with Brazilian prosecutor, 
municipal government representative and NGOs (IEB and NCA); and depth 
semi structured interviews with communities’ leaders and local people from 
Barcarena. Secondary data is information which was previously documented 
by other projects or for other purposes. In this study, I made use of IEB 
documents, theoretical literature, Hydro documents, newspapers online, 
corporate newsletters, corporate websites and annual sustainability reports. 
In order to support my analysis, this study employs Stakeholder Theory and 
the Corporate Social Responsibility literature to establish a conceptual 
framework. Stakeholder Theory asserts that business needs to consider the 
interests of groups affected by firms. Stakeholders are widely defined as 
suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, local communities, “groups or 
individuals with whom the organization interacts or has interdependencies” 
(Carroll 1993:60).   
Mitchell et al. (1997:875) propose a diagram of identification and salience 
(Figure 3) which recognizes classes of stakeholders by their possession or 
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attributed possession of one, two, or all three of the following attributes: (1) 
the stakeholder's power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of the 
stakeholder's relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of the 
stakeholder's claim on the firm. The combination of all three attributes is the 
defining feature of highly salient stakeholders in area 7 (‘definitive 
stakeholder’). 
 
Figure 3: Stakeholder identification 
Source: Mitchell et al. 1997:874 
 
This study will use the model to analyze the perspective of local communities 
as stakeholder of Norwegian company Hydro. The further analysis and 
justification of these terms will be discussed in chapter Four. 
1.3 Research Purpose and Relevance 
This thesis studies a case of Corporate Social Responsibility by a Norwegian 
company in Brazilian territory. The goal of the research is to contribute to 
better understanding of the involvement of local communities in corporate 
decisions by an international company promoting social and environment 
sustainability. Recent literature on development does not give much attention 
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to the expectations of local people in this particular debate. The research 
concerns a specific case - of Barcarena communities – but one of the purposes 
is to contribute to a larger debate about CSR and local communities’ 
empowerment.  
My interest in this study is especially due to the combination of three inter-
related aspects: 1) the exercise of Corporate Social Responsibility by an 
aggressive industry’s activities operating in the Amazon - a vulnerable 
ecosystem and poor rural local community; 2) the transfer of the business from 
a Brazilian company to a Norwegian company in 2011 and 3) the capacity 
building process of local stakeholders to pressure the business. 
1.4 Sustainable Development 
According to the concept discussed in the Brundtland Report in 1987 by World 
Commission on Environment and Development, sustainable development is 
defined by the development that “meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED 1987:8 in McNeill 2000). In other words, it is the challenge to ensure 
that economy will continue developing in fair social process and without 
compromising the natural resources that our children will demand in the future. 
Moreover, the concept was brought into discussion when people realized that 
environmental issues were increasing as a result of fast development of western 
society and in what foundation future reality would be built on in case of not 
diminishing the negative impacts in nature.  
Ever since its definition, sustainable development has been the drive behind 
various projects and policies that were aimed at combating the forces 
responsible for the alarming increase in environment degradation.  
However, when trying to implement the concept behind the theory, several 
challenges appear. By critically examining the term “sustainable 
development” we find the existence of an inherent contradiction. Simply put, 
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development relates to the increased improvement in the material wellbeing of 
people through growth, on the other hand sustainable development implies 
limits on growth.  
According to the discussion above, this study identifies two main players of 
the case: on one side, Norwegian Hydro, and on the other side, local 
communities in the Brazilian Amazon. More specifically, we see a company 
from developed Norway operating in a developing country, Brazil. This brings 
up the discussion of “rich nations” activities polluting “poor countries” 
environment. One might comment that this can create an unfair situation, with 
the headquarters in Oslo applying demanding codes of conduct and 
sustainability standards, while the aluminium production chain is polluting the 
soil and water supply in the countryside of Brazil. However, as observed by 
NGO project leader Arne Dale, there is a continuing economic need for 
aluminium worldwide and that fact will not change in the next years, so it is 
not a local matter but a worldwide situation.  The question is how to manage 
economic development while respecting local social demands and 
environmental vulnerability.  
1.5 Scope and Limitations of this study 
The intention of this research is to understand how communities’ leaderships 
in Barcarena perceive Hydro CSR and how this group responds to social and 
environmental issues as local stakeholders.  Due to limit time for fieldwork, 
this study did not conduct a large-N survey representative of all local people 
from Barcarena. Rather, it was decided to interview representatives of local 
neighborhoods (e.g. leaders, presidents of community centers). This study 
relies on the idea that those leaderships are chosen by the majority of the 
community to represent their interests.  
This study is also aware that single cases are not as strong a basis for 
generalizing to a population of cases as other research designs. However, 
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business sector, academics, NGOs and other local communities which connect 
with this case can learn much that is general from single cases.  
In order to describe my own role as a Brazilian researcher studying a Brazilian 
case study it may be useful to give a very brief summary. I was born and 
raised in the state of Santa Catarina, in Southern Brazil, which is known as one 
of the most developed region of the country according to educational, health 
and poverty rates (UNDP website). After my bachelor graduation 
(Journalism), I moved to Rio de Janeiro where I worked for four years. Not 
only that experience was important professionally, but also for personal 
growth due to daily challenges of social inequalities and urban violence plus 
for meeting extraordinary people and culture. When I started planning my trip 
to Pará, I felt it was a new opportunity to understand the plurality of the 
Brazilian scenario. I had already visited all five regions of Brazil, including 
the North, but the North is by far the most contrasting one when compared to 
where I grew up in the South, both culturally and socially. Nevertheless, I 
believe I am giving an insider-outsider perspective to this study. Although I 
am Brazilian, many things came across as new to me. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is composed by six main chapters. In the following chapter I will 
describe the Methodology Approach to this research project. In chapter Three 
I will present the case study. In chapter Four I will propose a Theoretical 
Framework for this thesis on Stakeholder Theory and CSR literature. Chapter 
Five will analyze the dynamic empowerment process of local communities in 
Barcarena. Finally, the concluding chapter will summarize the discussion and 
offer further reflections on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Amazon.  
 
 10 
2. Methodology 
The research design is the logical sequence that connects the research 
question, the empirical data and its conclusions. Yin (1994) explains that the 
research design is an action plan for getting from here to there, where here 
may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some 
set of conclusions or answers about these questions. 
2.1 An interdisciplinary approach 
Research can benefit much from interdisciplinary plurality. Drawing on 
different disciplines helps finding insights - that may either conflict or 
complement each other. The comparison of these different disciplines helps to 
better visualize the topic. 
Potential weaknesses of interdisciplinary include the communication gap 
between representatives of single disciplines and the risk of being superficial 
when combining a large number of approaches in a single research. These are 
weighed against potential benefits of interdisciplinarity. “To undertake 
interdisciplinary research is not easy. Some of the problems are intellectual, 
others are of a practical/organizational nature, either for the individual or the 
institution concerned” (McNeill 1999:319).  
2.2 The case study approach 
This research is an explanatory case study about a group of local communities 
in Barcarena (Brazil) and its relationship with Corporate Social Responsibility 
of Norwegian company Hydro.  
The reasons for studying this case originated from my interest in Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) in accordance to the interdisciplinary approach of 
lectures attended at Center of Development and Environment in University of 
Oslo (SUM/UiO). My starting point was Norwegian Corporate Social 
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Responsibility and business operating abroad. Since I have always been 
interested in local communities in the Amazon, I considered studying a case of 
a Norwegian company inside Brazilian Amazon. After reading about the 
subject and, more importantly, talking to people related to the aluminium 
production chain in Pará, I decided on my topic. 
As stated in Yin (1994), the case study allows an investigation to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as individual 
life cycles, organizational and managerial processes, neighborhoods change, 
international relations, and the maturation of industries (Yin 1994:3). 
Moreover, a case study is an in-depth study of a particular situation, focusing 
in-depth on a single case to truly formulate hypotheses or theories.  
Nevertheless I am aware that single cases are not such a strong base for 
generalizing to a population of cases as other research designs. However, 
people can learn much that is general from single cases.  
In other words, Stake (1995) also explained the importance of emphasis on 
uniqueness of the case itself. “The real business of case study is 
particularization, not generalization. We take a particular case and come to 
know it well, not primarily as to how it is different from others but what it is, 
what it does” (Stake 1995:8).  
Taking that into consideration, here I propose a list of qualitative research 
methods as my main tool to find if the empowerment of local communities in 
Barcarena towards Hydro CSR contributes to transparent goals from the 
industry and a more participant role for civil society. I agree that case studies 
rely on many of the same techniques as a story (e.g. secondary sources), in 
addition to two other sources of evidence, which are direct observation and 
systematic interviewing (Yin 1994). Here I will analyze a triangulation of 
multiple sources of evidence, such as documents, interviews and observations. 
Nevertheless, a major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity 
to use many different sources of evidence, as an integrated system. 
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2.3 Data gathering 
In order to present my process of data collection, I will divide it here in two 
parts: pre-fieldtrip and fieldtrip. As noted by Stake (1995), data gathering 
begins before there is commitment to do the study. One cannot ignore the 
advantage of the background, and acquaintance with other cases. For instance, 
as a Brazilian I have been following national news about industry in the 
Amazon for years regardless of any concrete plans of a master thesis. 
According to Yin (1994), a considerable proportion of all data is 
impressionist, picked up informally as the researcher first becomes acquainted 
with the case.  
During the first phase of the research, I have consulted many news articles 
about the impact of the aluminium production chain in the Amazon from local 
(Pará) and national (Brazilian) websites, magazines and newspapers. Then, I 
have started reading articles on Brazilian NGOs websites. The next step was 
looking for people related to the industry in Barcarena. After background 
research, I met a former consultant engineer of Hydro who agreed to talk 
informally about Hydro Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), the social 
situation of the municipality and his experience living there. After a one-hour 
phone call with him, I was feeling confident that I had found my topic. The 
source was decisive to double-check my first impressions of Hydro in 
Barcarena and until the end of my fieldwork he turned out to be a very helpful 
informant. An informant is just someone who knows a lot about the subject 
and is willing to talk. “As interviewees, the informants can provide 
observations, often already second-hand observations that the researchers 
cannot see for themselves” (Stake 1995:67). 
After that conversation, I started studying the history and geography of 
Barcarena as well as collecting data about Hydro CSR in Brazil. During the 
same period, I was trying to contact a person inside Hydro Brazil for a 
preliminary talk and in order to check to what extent the company would 
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accept to contribute to my research. That turned out to become my first elite 
interview of this study. ‘Elite’ is a group that control specific resources by 
means of which they acquire political power and material advantage. They 
have a particular role to play in a subject of the interview. Moreover it is a 
group of individuals that due to their economic resources, expertise, social 
networks or position on political/organization stand in a privileged position.  
It took a couple of months of exchanging e-mails with several Hydro 
departments until I could finally get in touch with the head of CSR at Hydro 
Brazil. On December 2013, I travelled to Rio de Janeiro and conducted the 
interview at Hydro’s office in Botafogo, where I was introduced to CSR 
programs in Barcarena. Given the opportunity to be inside the company, I took 
the chance to engage in informal conversations with business assistants, which 
gave me some idea of the corporate environment of Hydro in Brazil. At the 
office I found many institutional books and brochures that I could not find 
online during the previous months of research such as a copy of “Alunorte, 
uma história de sucesso” (2005), a book of the history of aluminium 
production chain in Pará since the 1970’s.  
Back in Norway I interviewed a project leader of Norwegian NGO, NCA, at 
their office in Oslo. Meanwhile I conducted a semi-structured interview with 
the former consultant engineer of Hydro via Skype and another with the 
Brazilian NGO, IEB. In fact, this last conversation was essential for deciding 
my angle for the research and gave me the opportunity to apply snowball 
sampling. Snowball sampling may be defined as a “technique for gathering 
research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to 
provide the names of other actors” (Faugier & Sargeant 1997). In my case, 
IEB project coordinator Maura Moraes gave me a list of names in the local 
community which later opened possibilities for expanding my network. 
Faugier & Sargeant (1997) also mentioned that this approach has been utilized 
primarily as a response to overcome the problems associated with sampling 
populations socially isolated. I would not specify Barcarena local communities 
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as extremely isolated groups socially, but I did face difficulties to reach them 
during the period of time when I was in Oslo. Most of local communities’ 
leaderships did not have an e-mail account while mobile phones had bad 
reception. 
Over a period of four months I planned my fieldtrip to Barcarena, including 
interviews with local communities’ leaderships and elite interviews with 
Hydro in Pará and Brazilian NGO, IEB. Since I was going alone, I also spent 
an amount of time organizing logistics such as transportation and 
accommodation. In parallel, I started studying theories and the background of 
the topic.  
My fieldtrip began in July 2014 and the second part of my data collection as 
well. The fieldwork plan involved one day in Belém, capital of state of Pará, 
one week in Barcarena and two days of traveling. Due to personal reasons and 
lack of financial resources, I could only stay for a short but intensive period of 
time in Pará. Therefore, I had confirmed time and place of eleven interviews 
in advance, which was very helpful. As mentioned by Rubin (2005), the 
process of deciding who will be your interviewees is central to building 
confidence of the study results: 
You do not necessarily have to talk to a lot of people, but you have to 
talk to people who have had the appropriate experience, are 
knowledgeable, and are able to explain to you what they know. You need 
to select interviewees who collectively present an overall view of your 
topic, while at the same time choosing them with sufficiently different 
backgrounds to provide convincing evidence for the theory you are 
trying to build (Rubin 2005:70). 
In total, I conducted 15 interviews during the fieldtrip: two social workers of 
NGO IEB, five local communities’ representatives, two CSR managers of 
Hydro, two students and football players of Hydro’s team, two consultant 
engineers, one special advisor of the Public Ministry and one local taxi driver. 
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The consultant engineers of Hydro and the taxi driver preferred to stay 
anonymous. All the others had no reservations to audio record the interviews 
and publish their names in this thesis. 
2.4 Interviews 
All the interviews were conducted between me and the informant alone. Once 
I travelled to Pará by myself both interviews and direct observation were made 
exclusively by me. Language was not a problem because I am Brazilian and a 
fluent Portuguese speaker. Notwithstanding, sometimes I had to ask my 
interviewees to explain some specific local expression or double-check 
regional vocabulary.  
Firstly, I will describe the visit to IEB office in Belém which was the first leg 
of the trip. The easiest way to get there is by a two-hour flight from Brasília, 
the capital of Brazil. I arrived at IEB headquarters, where I conducted a semi 
structured interview with the project assistant and then with the project leader. 
Semi structured interviews are designed to have a number of questions 
prepared in advance but also designed in a way to be sufficiently open so the 
subsequence questions may be improvised according to the answers. During 
my visit to IEB office, I had access to documents and books that were 
essential for later understanding of the capacity building process in Barcarena. 
On the second day I started my conversations with the local community 
leaders in Barcarena. To reach Barcarena one can choose between two 
options: a 120 km ride by bus or a 2 hour trip by boat. Even though it took a 
longer journey, I decided to go by boat since it is the most popular way of 
transportation among local people.  
Once there, I found that Barcarena is divided in three main districts. The Old 
Barcarena, Vila dos Cabanos and the Industrial District. I arrived at the old 
town where I could find the main church, a bank agency, a residential 
neighborhood, the main square and few small shops around it. Vila dos 
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Cabanos is a 15 minute car drive from Old Barcarena. It was settled as a 
proletarian neighborhood by Albras in the 1980’s. There are schools, 
restaurants, supermarket and local shops. Since it is more central, I stayed in 
Vila dos Cabanos during that week. And finally, the Industrial District which 
is located further west, where Albras and Alunorte are settled, the two biggest 
plants in Barcarena. Smaller neighborhood such as Itupanema, São Francisco 
and Vila do Conde are located around these three districts. 
I had previously talked to all of the fieldwork’s informants over the phone 
when I was in Oslo with exception of the special advisor of the Public 
Ministry and the three anonymous sources. At that time I introduced myself as 
a master student with no connections whatsoever with Hydro, NGOs or local 
government. That was an important statement to build trust. All community 
leaders that I reached agreed to talk to me personally. In order to let them feel 
at ease, I asked them to choose the time and place to talk. Two of them asked 
to meet them at their local community center, one decided to talk to me at the 
hotel’s restaurant and two other leaders were available for interviews during 
lunch break from an environmental workshop. Previously, I had prepared an 
open-ended interview guide, in which I was able to ask my respondents for the 
facts of a subject as well as for the respondent’s opinions about events. At 
some situations, I proposed them to give me their own insight into certain 
episodes. “Qualitative interviews are conversations in which a researcher 
gently guides a conversational partner in an extended discussion” (Rubin 
2005:4-5). Unlike survey research, in which exactly the same list of questions 
is asked to each informant, in qualitative interviews each conversation is 
unique.  
My visit to Hydro Alunorte took an entire day. I managed to attend the 
meeting with Alunorte Rain Forest football team before their departure to 
Norway Cup (the football team will be described further in chapter Three), 
plus take a tour around the plant and interview the director of Alunorte and the 
head of CSR at Hydro Barcarena.  
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On my way from one place to another, I was continuously watching the daily 
routine of the town, whether I was seated on the boat, having coffee or on the 
bus stop. Direct observation was an essential data gathering that would not 
have been possible if I had not stayed in Barcarena for a period of time. In 
fact, just being there was already an advantage for the study.  
After I came back to Oslo, I conducted two more interviews by phone. One 
with a representative of local government, the secretary of Urban Planning and 
Institution Relations of Barcarena, and another with the prosecutor responsible 
for the Conduct Adjustment Agreement (CAA) which was the first step to the 
capacity building process in the municipality. The two interviews conducted 
by phone were double checked via e-mail. It took more time to set a time and 
day to have the conversation than usual due to bureaucracy and tight schedule 
of public sector in Brazil. 
Overall, interviews were an essential source of evidence for this case study 
since well-informed respondents can provide important insights into a 
situation. Nevertheless, various sources are highly complementary. 
2.5 Interview list  
Final interview list, including 3 pre-fieldtrip, 15 from the fieldtrip and 2 post-fieldtrip 
interviews: 
 
HYDRO 
1) Hans Eide, Head of CSR at Hydro Brazil Rio de Janeiro 
2) Elena Brito, Head of CSR and Relationship with Communities at Hydro Barcarena 
3) Joel Câmara, President Director at Hydro Alunorte 
4) Jerônimo Coutinho Jr., Former Consultant Engineer at Hydro (and Alcoa) 
5) Anonymous engineer #1 
6) Anonymous engineer #2 
 
LOCAL PEOPLE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
7) Walmir Souza, Leader of Public Education Union of the State of Pará at Barcarena  
8) Rosemiro dos Santos, President of Association of Friends of the Industrial District 
9) Angela Maria Santiago, Leader of Center Community of Vila Nova Itupanema  
10) Petrolino Alves, Leader of National Front of Urban Resistance in Barcarena 
11) Cleide Monteiro, Leader of Association of Acuí Rural Workers 
12) Mel Gibson Santana, Student and captain of the Alunorte Rain Forest football team 
13) Gustavo Freitas, Student and member of Alunorte Rain Forest football team 
14) Anonymous taxi driver  
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NGOs 
15) Arne Dale, Programme Coordinator Brazil at NGO Norwegian Church Aid 
16) Maura Moraes, Project Coordinator at NGO IEB 
17) Rita de Cássia Santos, Assistant Project Coordinator at NGO IEB 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
18) Alberto Góes, Secretary of Urban Planning and Institution Relations of Barcarena 
 
PUBLIC MINISTRY 
19) Raimundo Moraes, Prosecutor of the state of Pará and responsible for CAA in Barcarena 
20) Paulo Rabelo, Special Advisor of Public Ministry of Pará 
2.6 Data analysis 
After transcribing my recorded interviews and translating it to English, I coded 
them. The process of coding involves systematically labelling concepts, 
themes, events, and topic markers so that you can readily retrieve and examine 
all of the data units that refer to the same subject across all your interviews.  
My data gathering findings (interviews, books, articles, brochures) were then 
labelled in five separate themes: A) Barcarena & aluminium; B) Norwegian 
versus Brazilian identity; C) Shifting from Vale to Hydro; D) Hydro CSR and 
E) Forum of Civil Society Network & Local Government. According to my 
research question, I paid relatively more attention to the answers of groups C,  
D and E, even though the other questions were valuable to contextualize the 
industry impact over the years in Barcarena.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2.7 Ethical Considerations 
Since this case study proposes to discuss local communities’ realities, the main 
ethical responsibility as a researcher was to respect local people’s privacy, 
choices and conditions. During the data gathering process of the study 
thoroughness and accuracy were the two main drivers. Thoroughness means 
investigating all the relevant options with care and completeness, checking out 
facts and tracking down discrepancies. From the beginning I was cautious on 
choosing interviewees to obtain the most information possible of the story and 
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prepared follow-up questions when evidence was missing. Regarding 
accuracy, it represents being careful in transcribing and editing interviews 
according to the original version. It also means that the interviewer does not 
put words into someone’s (interviewee) mouth.  
In order to be transparent and professional about my objectives, I wrote an 
introductory letter to all my elite interviewees at first contact with them. The 
presentation included my background, my research proposal at University of 
Oslo, professional references, and how their participation would contribute to 
my study. Moreover, I had the obligation to warn interviewees if something 
they were saying might get them in trouble and give them an opportunity to 
retract what they had said or be quoted anonymously. On two occasions my 
informants asked to make a statement off the record; both were about their 
opinions concerning local government.  
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3. The case 
In order to understand the perspective of local communities towards the 
aluminium production chain of Norwegian company Hydro, this chapter will 
address the main actors which contributed in different degrees to the current 
situation in Barcarena: federal and municipal government, other industries in 
town, the local prosecutor (who required the adjustment agreement in 2007, 
which will be addressed further in this chapter), Brazilian company Vale, 
Hydro and two NGOs, IEB and NCA. 
The first part of the chapter will give an overview of Barcarena social 
economic background and a retrospective of the industry hub which started in 
the 1980’s. The study will explain the social and environmental impact of the 
new economy to local communities and the role of the local government. 
Then, the chapter will address the aluminium production chain in Barcarena: 
the shift from Brazilian company Vale to Norwegian company Hydro and 
Corporate Social Responsibility of both businesses. 
The second part of this chapter will describe a list of environmental accidents 
which happened in Barcarena due to industrial activities, with special focus on 
the damage from 2007. The episode resulted in the creation of the conduct 
adjustment agreement (CAA), the capacity building program undertaken in 
2009 and the project called Intersectoral Forum. In addition, the study will 
describe the role of two NGOs, Brazilian IEB and Norwegian NCA. 
3.1 Barcarena 
Barcarena is located 87 km from Belém, the state capital of Pará, in Northern 
Brazil. Pará is the second largest state in Brazil and is bounded to the North by 
Guyana, Suriname and the Brazilian state of Amapá; to the Northeast by the 
Atlantic Ocean; to the East by the Brazilian states of Maranhão and Tocantins; 
to the South by Mato Grosso; and to the West by Amazonas (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Map of state of Pará 
Source: IBGE 
 
 
Figure 5: Location of Barcarena 
Source: IBGE 
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The area of Barcarena is 1,310 km² and it is situated near the mouth of the 
Amazon River. Its location is strategic for international commerce and 
regional trade, by linking different transport modes: roads, railroads and 
waterways. “For this reason, the Federal Government and large national and 
transnational corporations have expressed special interest in the municipality” 
(IEB 2012).  
 
 
Figure 6: Map of Barcarena 
Source: Albras 
 
In 2013, 109,975 people were living in Barcarena, which was primarily 
inhabited by indigenous tribes called Aruãs and until now is famous for its 
natural attractions, such as Conde and Caripi beaches. It became nationally 
known during the social revolt called Cabanagem from 1835 to 1840. One of 
the reasons of the mutiny was the extreme poverty and political 
marginalisation of the region right after the independence of Brazil in 1822. 
The name cabanagem was a reference to the type of hut used by poor people 
living close to streams, mainly freed slaves and indigenous people. By the end 
of the revolt, it is estimated that 35 percent of the population of the states of 
Pará and Maranhão died in the conflict. 
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Until the 1970’s, Barcarena was a supply center of agricultural and forestry 
products to Belém, based on family ownership of land and common use of the 
forest and rivers. Nowadays, agricultural and forestry activities are secondary. 
Industry alone represents 67 percent of the local GDP (IBGE 2011). In 2011, 
the ten largest companies located in the municipality sold about US$ 2.7 
billion (Table 1), equivalent to 15 percent of the volume obtained from exports 
generated by Pará state as a whole.  
Table 1: Revenue of ten largest companies in Barcarena in 2011 
Source: IEB 2012:17 
This structural change from rural to industrial economy is closely linked to 
two main factors: the Brazilian dictatorship and the oil crisis.  
3.1.1 Brazilian dictatorship impact in national economy 
The first factor to the structural change mentioned was the Brazilian Military 
Government from 1964 to 1985, which is associated with the history of 
territorial settlement and large infrastructure projects in the Amazon. Until the 
late 1950’s, the Amazon was covering over half the territory of Brazil and was 
characterized by a low population density and low national integration. The 
region with its huge stock of natural resources and its vast "empty spaces" was 
considered by the Military Government a key point to quickly solve economic, 
social and geopolitical problems. In this context, development policies were 
formulated and implemented with the main objective of maximising 
Company Total revenue in 2011 (US$) 
Alumina Norte do Brasil S/A (Alunorte) 1,432,000,000 
Alumínio Brasileiro S/A (Albras) 960,000,000 
Imerys Rio Capim Caulim S/A 182,000,000 
Usina Siderúrgica do Pará (Usipar)  73,000,000 
Pará Pigmentos S/A 31,000,000 
Mineracão Buritirama S/A 15,000,000 
Alubar Metais e Cabos S/A 5,900,000 
Indústria e Comércio de Conservas Maiauatá Ltda 2,700,000 
MRM Dias e Cia. Ltda 126,000 
Pinheiro Comércio de Materiais e Construcão Ltda 40,000 
Total 2,701,766,000 
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immediate economic benefits. The goal was to ensure the economic 
exploitation of the region’s abundant natural resources, so the government 
took possession of enormous areas, ignoring the land rights of great part of the 
native population (IEB 2012).  
In addition to that posture, the Second National Development Plan adopted in 
the Geisel Government (1974-1979) stressed the importance of expanding 
infrastructure investments - particularly in the areas of energy, transport and 
communications - for the export of specific products. The plan was to heavily 
invest in the expansion of basic industries, which would be located in selected 
areas of the Amazon.   
Due to its resources (mineral, timber), the National Plan conceived the 
Amazon region as a "tropical border". In addition, tax incentives would be 
granted by the federal government with the purpose of stimulating the 
activities geared towards exports to the benefit of private companies. This 
program represented an important change in government policy, which began 
to prioritize the large agricultural production, private projects associated with 
investments in infrastructure, mining and processing of minerals. 
After the Brazilian Government moved the capital from Rio de Janeiro to 
Brasília in the 1960’s, it started investing in road networks to connect the 
Amazon region to the Southeast of Brazil, the dominant economic region of 
the country. The construction of the Belém-Brasília highway in the 1970’s was 
essential for the implementation of large-scale projects including the Tucuruí 
hydropower complex. 
The initial drive behind the construction of a hydropower dam in Pará was to 
provide electricity for the city of Belém and the surrounding region. However, 
the primary focus of the project was changed to providing power for the 
energy intensive electro-metallurgical industry in the region.  
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The Tucuruí complex included the implementation of fifteen hydropower 
projects. Tucuruí currently has an installed capacity of 8,370 megawatts 
(MW). Located at the lower Tocantins River, adjacent to the Amazon Basin in 
Northeastern Brazil, this is the largest dam ever built in a tropical rainforest, 
and with an area of 2,875 km2, it is also the largest man-made lake ever built 
in such a place. 
During the construction period, Brazilian legislation did not require an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. This was not a legal obligation until the 
National Environmental Policy in the Federal Constitution Act of 1988 (Junior 
et al. 2006). The project from state company Eletronorte was modified during 
construction, resulting in an increased flooded area in order to achieve the 
initially predicted power amount. The area in the reservoir increased to 2,875 
km² (18 percent larger than previous project), the volume of water to 50.3 
trillion liters, and the perimeter increased more than 40 percent.  
The construction of the dam and reservoir formation was responsible for major 
changes in the ecosystem. It is estimated that 13.4 million cubic meters of 
timber with commercial value, and various species of animals and plants, were 
lost due to flooding.  The construction and operation of the reservoir of the 
dam changed the course of the river system, damaged archaeological sites, 
caused emission of gases, impacted the quality of the water and caused an 
overpopulation of insects. In addition, the hydropower complex was 
responsible for the displacement of local population from flooded lands that 
were living close to the dam perimeter (IDESP 1991). 
The view that the Amazon Rainforest is a body for exploration is often the 
subject of discussions in academia and media. Brazilian journalist Eliane 
Brum wrote an article about the heritage of the military dictatorship rooted in 
the imagination of Brazilians regarding the Amazon. She concluded that if the 
logic of the explorer/colonizer historically guided the ‘internalization’ of the 
country, the dictatorship gave it a more ambitious ideological package: 
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The dictatorship cemented the idea of Amazon as ‘green desert’, 
ignoring all human wealth, cultural and biological diversity that existed 
there. The dissemination of this fantasy is so successful that it became 
the ‘truth’. And it remains perceived as the truth after the 
democratization process (Brum 31/03/2014). 
3.1.2 World oil crisis  
The second episode to collaborate to industry investments in Pará was the 
global oil crisis that began in the 1973. The crisis reflected negatively on the 
industrial production of Japan, a major consumer of aluminium. Japan began 
to transfer its primary metal manufacturing units to peripheral countries with 
favorable local conditions such as power, cheap labour and little restrictive 
environmental legislation, thus requiring less investment and promising quick 
profits.  
In 1976, Brazil signed a cooperation agreement with Japan to install an 
aluminium production complex in Pará. The following year, the government 
announced the expropriation of 40,000 hectares of land previously inhabited 
by small farmers, hunters and gatherers of non-timber forest products (Leal 
1982 in IEB 2012). The plan included the development of the industrial 
district, the urban core of Vila dos Cabanos, the industrial complex 
(Albras/Alunorte), Vila dos Cabanos Port and power station. In 1978, Albras 
was established by bringing together 51 percent of capital through Brazilian 
Company Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) and 49 percent of Japanese capital 
through Nippon Amazon Aluminium Co. Ltd. (NAAC). In 1985, Alunorte was 
installed in Barcarena, and in 1996 the companies operating in the kaolin 
sector (Pará Pigments and Imerys Rio Capim Kaolin) were installed, too. 
The population growth data can be used to illustrate the impact of industry in 
Barcarena. In the 1970’s the population of Barcarena was 17,498 inhabitants 
(IBGE 1970). In 40 years, the population had grown 470 percent to 99,859 
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(IBGE 2010) – and up to 109,975 inhabitants in 2013, according to local 
government statistics. 
The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita of Barcarena is the third 
highest in Pará (R$ 35,639 or US$ 13,7334) and it is even higher than urban 
centers such as Rio de Janeiro (R$ 32,940 or US$ 12,694). However, the 
earnings of companies based in the municipality have not been directly 
translated into social development.  
The most recent national poverty index in Brazil (IBGE 2003) shows that 
30.78 percent of the population in Barcarena is considered poor. In Rio de 
Janeiro, for example, 23 percent of the population is considered poor. 
According to the research institution responsible, poverty is measured based 
on criteria defined by specialists who analyse the consumption capacity of 
people. They considered poor the individual who cannot have access to the 
recommended minimum (food and goods) for a family’s survival and 
sustenance (IBGE 2003). 
According to a recent survey by Brazilian research center Evandro Chagas 
Institute, Barcarena is poorly served by basic sanitation. It shows that 92.8 
percent of water samples collected in households and 90 percent of 
groundwater (wells) are unfit for human consumption (Lima et al. 2011). The 
problem in health and sanitation is reproduced in other areas: the absence of a 
housing policy for low income families, violence, drug use, lack of 
transparency in the use of public money and inadequate investment in 
education are just a few (IEB 2012). 
Barcarena contributes significantly to Pará GDP. In 2011, companies located 
in the municipality revenue US$ 2.701 billion (Table 1). The main 
destinations of 2011 exports were Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and 
the United States (IEB 2012). Imports by companies based in Barcarena were 
approximately US$ 545 million.  
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The difference between the income earned by corporations located in 
Barcarena and tax revenues destined for the municipality reveals inequalities 
both in the private sector and public authorities’ management. The table below 
(Table 2) shows the growth of municipal revenues in the period between 2001 
and 2008. Regarding revenue transfers that are constitutionally mandatory 
from the federal and state governments, the amount received by Barcarena 
grew considerably from 1997 to 2009 (Table 3). 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
13.17 15.28 8.36 - 36.02 - 52.92 71.49 
Table 2: Barcarena municipal transferred revenue source (in millions US$) 
Source: TCU  
 
Year Total (in millions US$) 
1997 10.51 
1998 11.95 
1999 9.13 
2000 10.59 
2001 10.55 
2002 12.26 
2003 13.80 
2004 16.03 
2005 25.75 
2006 32.15 
2007 39.74 
2008 54.57 
2009 51.81 
Table 3: Constitutional Transfers of Various Tax Revenues to the Municipality of 
Barcarena from 1997-2009 
Source: Pará State Secretary of Finance/Secretary of Education/Secretary of National Treasure 
3.2 Local government 
According to the interviews, local politicians do not have a good reputation, 
especially regarding social and environmental issues in Barcarena. Local 
communities and NGOs (IEB and NCA) compared the relationship with the 
municipal government as a ‘ping pong game’: 
 29 
We used to talk to the company and explain that if they were polluting 
the city they should do something about it. They replied saying that they 
pay taxes and we should go after the local government. Then the local 
government said: ‘no, it is the company who is polluting so you should 
talk to them’. It was the same thing over and over again (Monteiro: 
interview 17.07.2014). 
“There is no one that we can rely on”, argued community leader Angela 
Santiago. According to her, Barcarena is abandoned, with garbage on streets 
and no maintenance. Another characteristic mentioned is omission. However, 
Rosemiro dos Santos stresses some setbacks in the political system which makes 
it difficult for municipality actions to take place:  
The state government follows the interest of the federal government, but 
who really needs to solve the problem at the end of the day is the 
municipality, which has no technical and efficient support for these 
demands. The company says it pays the taxes accordingly while the 
mayor says that companies are not paying. So it is always this game of 
pushing one responsibility to another (dos Santos: interview 15.07.2014). 
As stated by IEB project assistant, Rita de Cassia Santos, the Brazilian 
government has been historically making top-down investments. The same 
thing happened with major projects during the military dictatorship in order to 
develop Amazon Region. At the moment, other large enterprises are coming to 
the region regardless if the population used to rely on natural resources to 
survive. Santos describes that part of the population is already facing the 
consequences of the projects and the government is not anticipating the negative 
impact that these new developments will cause on that territory.  
The Head of Hydro CSR asserts that the economy is not the problem. Hans Eide 
Aarre believes that is a question of political culture which local politics are ruled 
by elite politicians which only care about their own interests.  
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The secretary of Urban Planning, Alberto Góes, defends local government 
describing multiple social councils as the main instruments of the municipality 
relationship with communities. The society chooses the representatives who 
will join the meetings. Today, Barcarena counts with the City Council 
(Concidebar), Board of Health, Social Welfare Council, Council of People with 
Disabilities, Council for the Defense of Children and Adolescents, Board of 
Education, Board of Fundeb, Council of School Meals Council Community 
Safety, Sustainable Rural Development Council, Women's Council and 
Environment Council. The municipality also represent local municipal power 
in Intersectoral Forum. However, IEB coordinator thinks they do not have the 
same commitment that Hydro has showed. 
3.3 Aluminium production chain 
The aluminum complex of Albras/Alunorte was the main industrial investment 
in Barcarena. In the 1970’s, Brazilian government offered many attractive 
conditions to catch business attention, especially foreign companies. One of 
the infrastructures was the creation of Eletronorte (Centrais Elétricas do Norte 
do Brasil) in September 1973 in order to build a large hydroelectric plant 
(Turucuí dam) and, consequently, to expand the energetic potential of the 
region. Federal government also invested in roads and in a port intended for 
bulk and cargo carrier for deep draft.  
The area designed for the construction of the aluminium industrial complex in 
the municipality currently occupies 40,000 hectares, distributed in four main 
sectors: a) industrial area: includes the port in Vila do Conde; Alunorte plant, 
Albras plant, Eletronorte area (next to the substation, connected to hydropower  
plant Tucuruí), and expansion of the area intended for the installation of the 
industrial district; b) the area of urban growth: reserved to meet the demand of 
industrial plots; c) area of transition: aimed for protection of the Ecological 
Reserve and support of diversified activities; and d) the area of implantation of 
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the new urban core of Barcarena: where residences of workers of 
Albras/Alunorte were built. 
 
Figure 7: Alunorte plant in Barcarena 
Source: Alunorte 
 
The choice for this area took into consideration many positive aspects of 
Barcarena, which included the relative proximity of the sources of its main 
inputs, bauxite and electricity; the possibility of constructing and using a 
harbour that allows the attraction of large capacity ships (above 40,000 tons); 
the characteristics of soil with flat topography and very favorable for the 
support of underground foundations of manufactures; the existence of water in 
quality and volume for industrial use; the availability of cheap labour; and 
finally, for being an area with low density of occupation and at the same time, 
close to a large urban center, Belém. 
The aluminium production chain in Barcarena is composed by a bauxite 
processing plant and an aluminium production plant which are closely 
connected to the extract of bauxite from Paragominas and Trombetas quarries, 
both in the state of Pará. The product is transported to Barcarena, where it 
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refines the raw material to alumina (aluminium oxide) and later produces 
aluminium metal (460,000 tons annually).  
In Barcarena, the production chain starts in the Alunorte plant. Alunorte is the 
world's largest alumina refinery and has nearly 1,600 permanent employees 
and about 800 long-term contractors. Production at Alunorte started in 1995 
and after three expansions it has now a total annual capacity of 6 million 
metric tons. A substantial portion of the alumina is shipped to aluminium 
smelters in other parts of the world and to other aluminium metal plants. Plus, 
some of the alumina goes straight to the neighboring business Albras. Albras 
is the second-largest aluminium metal plant in Brazil with 1,200 permanent 
employees and over 400 workers on long-term contracts. Albras has produced 
aluminium since 1985 and has annual production capacity of about 460,000 
tons. The company gets its electricity from the Tucuruí hydro-power plant. 
(Hydro Institutional Report 2013) 
In order to better understand the impact of this industry in environmental 
terms it may be useful to summarise the processes that are involved: 
3.3.1 Alumina 
Alumina is the main input for aluminium production. It is obtained from the 
processing of bauxite which is extracted from towns of Trombetas and 
Paragominas, both in the state of Pará. In Trombetas (located west of the 
state), oxide is supplied by Mineração Rio do Norte (MRN) and it is 
transported by ship to Vila do Conde Port in Barcarena. The other supplier is 
the Mineração Bauxita de Paragominas (in the Northeast of the state) where 
the ore is transported through a pipeline that crosses seven municipalities and 
is 150 miles long.  
Upon the arrival in Alunorte the water contained in the material is removed in 
a process known as dewatering. MRN oxide ore arrives in the harbor; it is 
stored in the stocking area then placed in the belts and sent to the mills where 
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it is crushed until it reaches optimum size for processing. The next step is 
digesting phase where alumina is extracted from oxide through a reaction with 
caustic soda. The process takes place in pressurized containers at 145 degrees 
Celsius.  
 
Figure 8: Production of alumina 
Source: Hydro 
 
When alumina is extracted from bauxite, the process creates about an equal 
amount of bauxite residue, also known as red mud. This needs to be managed 
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properly to protect the environment, and is a challenging part of alumina 
production. There are two models of storage:  lagoons and dry stacking. Hydro 
uses dry stacking to store bauxite residue. In parallel to that, there are other 
environmental issues related to alumina production: high amount of energy 
consumption, water management and impacts from the plant’s infrastructure 
and the bauxite residue disposal. 
3.3.2 Primary aluminium 
 
Figure 9: Production of primary aluminium 
Source: Hydro  
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3.4 Simple life versus big profit aluminium complex 
Although Barcarena is one of the biggest GDP of the state, there are clearly 
many social problems. According to IEB reports, the industry generates 
money but the wealth is poorly distributed. On the way to the main entrance of 
the town, the first thing one might notice is the amount of parked trucks 
waiting to enter the port. The visible consequences are right there: precarious 
roads without sideways, the growth of informal labour and prostitution.   
The profitable aluminium industry boosted the local economy and nowadays, 
Barcarena crosses a second development cycle. The town became an 
important logistical point (port, waterway, railroad), with the flow of raw 
materials and merchandise from Pará and other states of the North and 
Midwest of Brazil. According to IEB project leader Maura Moraes, it is not 
possible to have this set of new investments and demands to Barcarena while 
local people and traditional communities continue being penalized by the 
impacts and the consequences of this model (Moraes: interview 14.07.2014). 
All informants of this study listed examples of contrasting realities from the 
business profit such as NGO NCA project leader. “If you go there, the streets 
are bad, healthcare is bad, and there is corruption within the municipality” 
(Dale: interview 23.04.2014). NGO IEB project assistant Rita de Cássia 
Santos explained that urban development does not follow the economic 
development. “It is an antagonism that keeps growing over the years” (Santos: 
interview 24.07.2014).  
Local communities claim that local government was not prepared to deal with 
the new industrial scenario and the demands of social segments brought by 
industrial activities. Scholars such as Nahum (2011) alert to shortcuts either 
through “favor culture” and/or “political patronage” as being a frequent 
response of municipal governments to immediate demands of the population. 
Favor culture regards ethics of gratitude, for example, when the person who 
lives on the margins of social rights receives a favor from the powerful side 
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and then the first one becomes morally obligated to return the favor. Political 
patronage is about the relationship between political actors, involving the 
granting of public benefits such as jobs and tax benefits, in exchange for 
political support (e.g.  negotiation of votes). 
Plus, problems regarding employment, social justice and public policies are 
told to be frequently directed to unsustainable actions such as handing out 
food and charity campaigns.  
In general, local people preferred their living conditions before the industry 
came to Barcarena. If you start a conversation with a local citizen about life 
before the arrival of the aluminium complex, it is most certain that the talk 
will assume a nostalgic tone. “Before they (industry) arrived we used to have a 
lovely forest. There is this saying now: ‘we were happy and have not realized 
it’” (Monteiro 17.07.2014). According to community leader of Acuí, Cleide 
Monteiro, the industry came preaching sustainability but the result was 
different: 
They said ‘look, let's get you out of here and we will relocate you to 
another community and you are going to plant and grow vegetables to 
sell up inside the company’. But then what happened is that the new 
houses have not been paid and the group who said no to them, was 
forced to leave. They broke into the houses, dug and cut the houses with 
machines (Monteiro: interview 17.07.2014) 
The leader of Public Education Union, Walmir de Souza, illustrated the past 
change in town describing the traditional Pineapple Festival. About 30 years 
ago, the festival used to be held in the city center, where everybody could 
participate and enjoy music and dance for free. “After the industry settled 
down, the festival started to be organized in a closed square and people were 
coming from outside Barcarena. Plus, there is no longer a major production of 
pineapple” (Souza: interview 15.07.2014). He alerts that today it is dangerous 
to walk on the streets at night and mentions that after someone had broken into 
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his office he decided to install security cameras, something he would have 
never imagined doing in a small town like Barcarena: 
The idea was to bring progress and quality of life. This is not quality of 
life and this is not good for us. In the past, we could walk calmly on the 
streets. Last week, somebody murdered a drug dealer downtown. Three 
shots in the head. At Vila do Conde, three drug dealers were killed last 
week, too (Souza: interview 15.07.2014). 
The president of the Association of Friends of the Industrial District, Rosemiro 
dos Santos, asserts that 30 years ago the entrance to the local houses had no 
doors, just a hanging bed sheet for privacy. Now, this is not possible anymore. 
For him, industry has not been positive to town: “People die here every day, 
especially people that are related to drug traffic. We'd rather live in that simple 
life in the past, with quietness” (dos Santos: interview 15.07.2014). 
Furthermore, poverty can turn out as a key player for guaranteeing the 
continuity of power elite in Barcarena. Local communities have been 
historically distant from political decisions for many reasons. One of the 
obstacles has been the fact that local communities do not know what rights 
they have as civil society and, consequently, they do not know how to access 
the legal channels to demand it.  
When the industry moved to town, leaderships started to see the business as 
the face of the “saviour”. Because of the fact that they had money, experience 
and corporate buzzwords such as “Social Responsibility”, local communities 
saw on them the chance to demand changes. 
Among other local leaders, Cleide Monteiro does not agree with the idea that 
development has arrived within the aluminium complex: 
The industry has been preaching about sustainability and development of 
Barcarena. After 30 years, you realize that advertising is one thing and 
action is another. There is more economic growth, but what about the 
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development, sustainability and our priority to get good jobs? (Monteiro: 
interview 17.07.2014). 
According to Rosemiro dos Santos, when industry was installed in town, no 
one was aware of what Albras and Alunorte would have become today. “They 
(industry) came here and announced that they would have a very good project 
for the community but the problem is that the community had never gone 
through such an experience, it had no previous example” (dos Santos: 
interview 15.07.2014). The community used to live off of extraction, of 
hunting and fishing and many of them had to adapt their activities due to 
changes in the environment. The pupunheira activity was the first to suffer the 
impact. Pupunheira is a palm tree that produces a fruit called pupunha 
(Bactris gasipaes) which has a nutritional constitution similar to maize. 
Rosemiro explained that there are no more pupunheira trees in Barcarena, and 
the ones that beared up, do not produce fruits anymore. “They called it 
progress. What progress? Perhaps progress to the industry, progress to local 
government, but not to Barcarena” (dos Santos: interview 15.07.2014). 
3.5 CSR Vale in Barcarena 
Brazilian Vale was the main shareholder of the production chain in Barcarena 
until 2011.  The corporation was founded on June 1942 by the Brazilian 
Federal Government and currently is the largest iron-ore producer and the 
third largest mining company in the world. Vale had its control transferred to 
the private sector on May 1997, when the Consórcio Brasil, led by the 
National Steel Company (CSN) acquired 41.73 percent of the Federal 
Government’s common stock. The decision to privatize Vale caused much 
discussion among politicians and the public opinion due to alleged corruption 
and the economic value to the country. In 2013 revenues of Vale S.A. 
represented 48.1 billion dollars while annual earnings were US$ 2.38 per share 
(Bloomberg and Newsweek websites). 
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Although Vale is the second biggest corporation in Brazil and the sponsor of 
many social (e.g. Fundacão Vale), cultural (e.g. Inhotim Museum) and 
environmental (e.g. Reserva Natural Vale) programs nationally, the company 
has a controversial background. In fact, Vale was elected the world’s worst 
company in January 2012 by the Public Eye People’s, an award that refers to 
human rights and environment, given by the NGOs Greenpeace and Berne 
Declaration since 2000. Vale became the first Brazilian company to join the so 
called “Hall of Shame”, which according to the judges contain corporations whose 
business activities have been characterized by human rights violations, 
environmental destruction, immoral tax practices or corruption (Public Eye 
website). At the same year, the second place went to Japanese Tepco, which 
operates the nuclear power plants of Fukushima that were hit by a tsunami in 
March 2011. 
Vale´s reputation among the civil society in Barcarena is also negative. All the 
informants in this study mentioned one or more conflictual experiences 
regarding relationship between company and community. They called Vale as 
‘extremely bureaucratic’ and ‘slippery’ when regarding meetings with local 
people. Some of them reported bribe episodes but most complaints were about 
how Vale was keeping a distance from the community. “Every time we would 
ask for a meeting to express our demands, they didn’t solve the problem. They 
did listen, but didn’t solve anything because they didn’t care” (Souza: 
interview 15.07.2014). Leader of community center Vila Nova Itupanema, 
Angela Santiago explained that she used to be forbidden to visit Alunorte 
factory during the last years of Vale administration. “There was a sign in the 
reception saying I couldn’t pass Alunorte front gate. When Hydro came, they 
called the leaders for a presentation, including myself. Today we have a good 
relationship” (Santiago: interview 16.07.2014). She also mentioned that Hydro 
has accepted many demands from the local communities, although 
communities consider it just a preliminary negotiation process. 
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“Many people saw the Alunorte refinery during Vale administration as some 
sort of a bogeyman”, explained leader of National Front of Urban Resistance, 
Petrolino Alves. According to him, the leaderships had an idea that Europeans 
were very concerned with environmental issues but the community was still 
very worried about the change. “At that time we started studying the history of 
Hydro to get to know exactly what was coming to Barcarena. We were very 
concerned but also thinking it could be a solution. A way out from that 
situation” (Alves: interview 17.07.2014).  
Considering the experience in the work environment, both consultant 
engineers interviewed agreed with the negative reputation of Vale.  They said 
the company used to treat employees and suppliers very badly. One of the 
examples was the waiting and bureaucracy in the meetings even when the 
visitors needed to travel a long distance to get to Barcarena (usually one plane 
flight plus an hour by rented car). Despite the shift from Vale to Hydro, they 
do not think it will make a major difference. They blame the ‘corporate 
culture’ and its belief that industry owns the land. 
Norwegian NGO NCA believes that any business can do a better social job 
than Vale. According to project leader Arne Dale, Vale used to focus on 
charitable handouts projects in town and charity will not have a long-term 
effect in Barcarena. However, he knows Hydro wants to do something 
different from Vale and the company will distance themselves from Vale’s 
reputation since Vale is considered a situation where they’ve reached “rock 
bottom”.  
Nevertheless, leader Rosemiro dos Santos stressed the importance to take the 
whole context into the consideration. When Hydro purchased the shares local 
communities were already in an advanced stage (over two years) of the 
capacity building project of IEB. “We were more aware of rights and duties”. 
He explained that Hydro is more open than Vale and highlighted the 
transparency during the first meetings with local leaderships when the 
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company presented Hydro mission and values. According to Walmir dos 
Santos, the corporation mentioned that if any employee of Hydro is proven to 
have any link with corruption or bribe, the person will be fired. “Of course it 
can be just a nice speech, but it's interesting, isn’t? I have never heard a 
company saying this before” (dos Santos: interview 15.07.2014). 
Leader of community center of Acuí, Cleide Monteiro believes that Hydro will 
do a good job in Barcarena. As stated by her, in order to succeed, Hydro 
should build something together with the assistance of the local people from 
Barcarena. “The company needs to know more about what is going on in the 
head of the community and we need to interact more and also know what is 
going on in their mind and know the projects that they have for Barcarena” 
(Monteiro: interview 17.07.2014). Monteiro mentioned that she has never 
ignored the possibility of a new direction, however, her positive impressions 
of change were shaken after Hydro supposedly fired many former Vale 
employees and replaced them by people from outside the town (e.g. Belém, 
São Paulo and Belo Horizonte).  
Brazilian NGO IEB considered that Vale and Hydro have distinct relationships 
with Barcarena. The first sign of change was when Hydro announced that they 
wanted to talk to the local communities. “The moment that a company agrees 
to be part of a dialogue with 54 civil society organizations, you can see a 
change of behaviour” (Santos: interview 14.07.2014).  
According to Head of CSR Hydro in Barcarena, Elena Brito, Vale does not 
have a good reputation in Pará for many reasons and one of them is because it 
is the biggest mining company in Brazil, therefore they get a lot of criticism. 
“This shift was good to the image towards the communities. If someone 
knocked the door of Alunorte before, the person would get the information but 
there was not that initiative to bring the community closer” (Brito: interview: 
16.07.2014). 
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Through the acquisition of Vale's aluminium operations in Brazil in 2011, 
Norsk Hydro became the majority shareholder with 91 percent of alumina 
refinery Alunorte, 51 percent of aluminium plant Albras and 81 percent of 
CAP alumina factory project. Currently, Brazil is the country where the 
company has the most employees - more than 6,000 if long-term contractors 
are included. Before the transaction, Hydro already held 34 percent of 
Alunorte and 20 percent of CAP project (Companhia de Alumina do Pará). 
CAP is the new alumina refinery. The operation of raw material for aluminium 
production is scheduled to start production in 2015 based on bauxite supply 
from an expansion of Hydro’s mining operations in Paragominas, Brazil.  
3.6 CSR Hydro in Barcarena 
Based on the data gathered at Hydro Rio de Janeiro headquarters in the end of 
2013, Alunorte has been currently holding five main social programs.  The 
company has been responsible for sponsoring computer courses to local 
community, for supporting local fishermen business, for the project of 
greenhouses construction by local farmers (using heat exchanger tubes 
discarded by the refinery) and for a small factory business of women from 
local community which is the supplier of flanges protectors, diphoterine cases 
and ecobags for the refinery.  
Nevertheless, the football team sponsored by the company is by far the most 
popular social project in town. “Bola pra Frente” (an expression that means 
“kick the ball forward”, in Portuguese) is a football project and also 
educational program focused on students aged 13-19 years from 40 schools in 
Barcarena. There are seminars about ecology, health and campaigns against 
drugs and violence during the academic year. In order to be part of the 
Alunorte Rain Forest (ARF) team though, teenager boys4 must maintain high 
                                              
4 In previous editions, girls were also able to join a woman’s team. 
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grade records in studies, keep exemplary behavior in class as well as 
participate in environmental projects in school. There are three qualifiers and 
the chosen players start practicing with the coach for friendly matches in Pará 
and participate in the Norway Cup which is held in Oslo (Norway) every 
August. 
Norway Cup is the world's largest football tournament for kids and teenagers 
and has been held annually in Ekeberg, Oslo. Since the start in 1972, players, 
teams and referees from 126 nations have participated (Norway Cup website). 
In 2014 edition, Norway Cup had 1,560 registered teams. The 17 year-old Mel 
Gibson Santana explained that it is the dream of every kid in Barcarena to join 
ARF so it is very competitive. Santana is the current captain and it took four 
attempts for the student to get a place in the team. According to Hydro, the 
main goal is to transform boys into citizens through sport. Moreover it is an 
opportunity for the students to visit a new country and experience a new 
culture. During the meeting with family and players at Alunorte auditorium, 
16 years-old Gustavo Freitas was exciting to travel by plane for the first time 
and mentioned he believes that his life will be different after the project.  
 
Figure 10: Capitan Mel Gibson (top right) and ARF team in Alunorte  
Source: by the author 
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Besides traveling and playing football, ARF team also represents a different 
kind of opportunity for the young students. It means a chance to start a 
football career or a future internship inside the company called “Jovem 
Aprendiz” (Young Apprentice, in Portuguese). Thus, parents highly encourage 
their children to participate.  
This study identifies an extra role of the educational program “Bola pra 
Frente” to local communities: it was through the project that Barcarena got its 
first contact with Norwegian identity. Since the start in 2001, more than 
12,000 teenagers have joined the educational program which means that at 
least 3,000 families in Barcarena have some level of knowledge about 
Norway. In fact, all of the local people interviewed in this study were 
confident to say that Hydro was a Norwegian company and that Norway is a 
European country. Plus, they were able to mention some local curiosities such 
as ‘matpakke’ (sandwich packed lunch). Considering the basic level of 
academic education of many of the informants (with few exceptions), that 
knowledge came as a surprise during the interviews. Before fieldwork I 
assumed that Hydro would have an image of a random foreign company to 
local people with no references or connections to Barcarena. Moreover, the 
fact that society already had a positive experience from the football team, 
which was always sponsored by Hydro (even when the company had only 30 
percent of the shares of Alunorte), had an impact on positive expectations 
when the Norwegian organization became the main shareholder. Basically all 
informants said they believe that Norwegian companies are more responsible 
with social and environmental issues when compared to a Brazilian business. 
The first impressions towards Corporate Social Responsibility of Hydro does 
not always correspond to current expectations by local people as it will be 
discussed further in this chapter, but still, it is important to state that a foreign 
company was not seen as a threat by local communities. 
According to Hydro Brazil, CSR is a core part for the company and their 
reputation is very strong. “Brazil is a challenge and a focus area because risks 
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are very high due to the matter of corruption, in Pará especially, where there is 
a low level of awareness”, explained the head of CSR Hans Eide Aarre. 
Regarding the role of business in Barcarena, Aarre made it clear that Hydro 
wants to move away from the infrastructure projects of former owner Vale. 
“We want capacity building, education and income generation”, said Hydro 
executive. Problems with drugs and prostitution are seen as consequences 
issues. As noted by him, CSR portfolio of Vale is a guideline but Hydro is 
designing how to qualitatively measure it. “Right now, the projects are not 
good for defining the goals so it is important to have a tool to understand the 
goals of each program”, he declared. 
Currently, Albras and Alunorte social programs are quite independent from 
each other, even though Hydro owns them both. One of things that is common 
to Albras and Alunorte is precisely the department of Social Responsibility. In 
April 2014, Hydro created one management area called Communication and 
Local Community Relationship. “The company is in a middle of a critical 
analysis of project designs in order to make improvements or even shut down 
some programs”, explained Head of Hydro CSR in Barcarena, Elena Brito. 
In parallel with Hydro engagement in Intersectoral Forum (further discussed in 
this chapter), the company organizes a plan of factory visiting. Hydro has 
opened the door to 10 leaders of civil society of Barcarena for a couple of 
weeks and had employees available to answer technical questions on themes 
such as environmental damages. “Until recently, they (civil society) did not 
know the difference between charity and social responsibility. It was very 
difficult for our work. One of the most discussed concepts that we worked 
with them is what social responsibility is and which taxes we pay”, explained 
Brito: 
We are in the spotlight. We indeed have a great economic importance to 
this municipality and state. To my understanding, Hydro’s vision is to be 
transparent, to be relevant to this local community, and be accepted by 
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them.  We are now the largest in the world, and obviously the largest of 
Barcarena. And the two companies of Hydro, Albras and Alunorte are 
the two oldest, most traditional and the most well known in Barcarena, 
so it ends up that the full impact of society is falling on us. It is essential 
that people know what we do and how we do and know the ways to 
reach us (Brito: interview 16.07.2014). 
In addition to redesigning the former projects, Hydro recently created a new 
website, a newsletter and communication channels, such as an open phone 
number for questions, complaints, compliments and suggestions, in order to 
improve transparency. Plus, the company launched a newspaper about Albras, 
Alunorte and CAP focus on community (every two months) called "Canal 
Aberto" (Open Channel, in Portuguese). Another initiative is the direct contact 
with community operations, with a new system that accounts for the flow of 
information. The purpose is to show what and how the company operates in 
Barcarena. According to Hydro, the goal is to demystify a number of beliefs 
that have emerged over the years regarding the plants. For example, people 
used to believe that the dry stocking of red mud was considerably larger than it 
is in reality. The distance that Vale created between the communities over the 
last years was one of the responsible elements for the spread of these 
misinformed ideas. 
To NGO IEB, the expectations in the corporate level are positive even though 
they believe Hydro still has some difficulties concerning the dialogue in the 
“factory floor level”, when handling daily basis conflicts with local 
communities.  On the other hand, Hydro assumes the responsibility to clarify 
wrong information with transparency. As reported by Head of Hydro CSR, the 
only way to make it right is the inclusion of the community, especially in 
environmental issues. 
As stated by Alunorte director Joel Câmara during a presentation to ARF 
team, the Alunorte project called DRS2 is Hydro’s biggest project worldwide 
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and it involves R$ 830 million (U$ 322 million) which is an evidence that 
Hydro is willing to stay in Barcarena at least for the next 35 years. According 
to Câmara’s speech, the director would like to see communities becoming 
closer to the company. “My wish is to be part of the social and educational 
progress of Barcarena. (And) Not only the economic progress” (Câmara: 
interview 16.07.2014). 
Leader of the Public Education Union believes that companies should give 
opportunities and provide conditions to the families’ development. “It is not 
about giving them a box of food. The food will finish sooner or later. It is 
better to guarantee that communities can develop with their own hands” 
(Souza: interview 15.07.2014). 
It was clear to all leaderships interviewed that what Barcarena demands are 
long term sustainable proposals to the community:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
We completely understand the importance of the market, but when we 
see the amount of buses that comes from the capital it is frustrating. Most 
of the team who manages the company is from outside the town. They 
are from São Paulo, Minas Gerais...What is left for us is construction 
jobs. So they are not investing in qualifying manpower to manage the 
company. Moreover, when it does a social project it is not a project that 
will really leave a legacy to Barcarena (Monteiro: interview 17.07.2014). 
IEB called Hydro CSR strategy very fragmented and still in the process of 
adjusting social projects. The Brazilian NGO believes that Hydro is in that 
point of transition when the company will keep what they feel it makes sense 
according to their strategy. Their participation in the Forum, for example, it is 
a sign of a new Social Responsibility in Barcarena. Nevertheless the Brazilian 
NGO asserts is not about taking place of the government. Local government is 
the responsible to ensure effective public policies for this population that will 
be affected by large enterprises. To IEB, Corporate Social Responsibility role 
is to take responsibilities for the consequences of their activity on the territory 
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and the company should think how they can provide improvements and life 
quality in Barcarena. 
Meanwhile, NGOs are watching closely the new directions that Hydro CSR is 
intending to take. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA, which will be addressed in 
3.7), for example, is worried about charity projects that will not have a future 
impact and thus will not change much. “If the company is interested in 
developing the city, the area, the region, it’s not about giving money to small 
projects, but to think how to change the future” (Dale: interview 23.04.2014). 
However, while the majority of leaders say charity is not sustainable, some 
still sound confused by the role of social responsibility when giving real life 
examples of frustrating experience with the industry. To the President of 
Association of Friends of the Industrial District, Rosemiro dos Santos, like all 
other businesses, Hydro has a commitment, regardless of the tax it pays, 
because it has a budget to invest in social projects. In his opinion, Social 
Responsibility of the company should invest in agriculture in general. As 
stated by him, one of the biggest agricultural areas in Barcarena was precisely 
in Vila do Conde, so people have stopped producing to become consumers. 
The leader of National Front of Urban Resistance in Barcarena, Petrolino 
Alves, says that Alunorte responsibility to the community is huge since it is 
the largest alumina refinery in the world, although the projects of Vale were 
short-term oriented. He mentioned that once the company gave machines to a 
cassava flour production but it failed because Alunorte did not teach them how 
to run the business.  
Community leader Angela Santigo gets angry when describing an episode in 
2011 when workers went on strike and shut the doors of Alunorte factory. The 
company asked her to use an inside passage in Vila Nova Itupanema 
community that goes straight to the factory. Angela explained that, at that time 
the company did not respect them so she asked something in return. She 
demanded a new electricity system to the community center as well as general 
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improvements. As stated by Angela, the deal was to have a computer room, 
but Hydro did not get the 10 computers they had promised. “So even though 
Hydro says there is a corporate social responsibility inside the company, here 
we need to beg and wait and see if they will do it or not” (Santiago: interview 
16.07.2014). 
During informal conversations with local people on fieldwork, I heard them 
saying it was common to call the company for help when someone in the 
family was very sick and need transportation for a hospital in the city, for 
example.  
3.7 Norwegian Church Aid in Barcarena 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is an ecumenical diaconal organization for 
global justice founded in 1947. NCA provides emergency assistance in 
disasters and works for long-term development in local communities. 
Currently, the NGO main funding sources are Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation  (NORAD), Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), Operation Day’s Work campaign (ODW) and own NCA funds.  
NCA Program for Brazil took form in 1992 with funds raised by the ODW5 
from Norwegian students. Over the last 50 years, ODW has supported 
education projects in over 60 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Every year the students choose a new project at the annual meeting of the 
School Student Union (ODW website). 
NCA sees that the organization might play an important role with strengthened 
relations between Norway and Brazil, both on state and business level. As 
stated on NCA reports (NCA 2010) Norwegian investments in Brazil are 
increasing rapidly, but still without a sufficient emphasis on the social 
                                              
5 Today, ODW is the largest youth campaign in Norway with over 4,000 volunteers. 
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environmental responsibility of the companies. In addition to that, a big 
concern for NCA is Norway’s significant support to The Amazon Fund and 
the lack of mechanisms to secure true involvement and access to the funds for 
civil society organizations. 
Over the last 15 years, Brazil has emerged as one of the central political actors 
by being part of G206. The country has gained a position of a key player in 
international negotiations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
is actively seeking positions as a negotiator in regional conflicts in Latin 
America.  
Since the 1990’s, NCA actions in Brazil have grown through the identification 
and inclusion of new strategic partners. The global vision of NCA’s program 
in Brazil is to promote the human dignity of disadvantaged and excluded 
people giving support to partners and to its work programs to increase 
participation, equity and protection. This is done by providing support that 
strengthens relevant institutions within civil society (NCA 2010). They also 
work with Corporate Responsibility, mainly in Norwegian companies 
worldwide.  
According to the project leader of NCA in Brazil, the first focus in the country 
was the company Aracruz, in Espírito Santo state, because the director of the 
company, Erling Lorentzen, is Norwegian. Later on, they started focusing on 
Hydro and its operation in Barcarena. “But it was only after Hydro bought a 
larger share of Alunorte and Albras that we started our real work in 
Barcarena”, said Programme Coordinator Brazil at NCA, Arne Dale. As stated 
by the NGO, civil society in Barcarena is weak and representing the people 
who have nothing. Therefore, the current goal of NCA is to help the local 
people to achieve a little more balance between them and the industry. “We 
want to show that they (local communities) are not alone”, concluded Dale.  
                                              
6 Group of 19 major economies countries and the European Union, with representatives of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
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3.8 Environmental accidents in Barcarena 
Industrial production in Barcarena is mainly based on the exploitation of 
natural resources. Environmental accidents are one of the most damaging 
problems associated with economic growth. Since 2003, there have been 13 
main environmental accidents and damages documented by reports from IEB, 
Evandro Chagas Institute and the local newspaper “O Liberal” (Table 4).  
Date of accidents Environmental accidents and 
damages 
Company 
April & May 2003 Drainage of red mud into the 
Murucupi River 
Alunorte 
June 2003 Death of fish on Itupanema beach 
due to drainage of waste  
Alunorte 
November 2004 Cloud of soot over Vila do Conde 
Port 
 
February 2006 Algae blooming in the Mucuruçá 
streams and off Caripi Beach 
 
August 2006 Contamination of well in the 
Industrial District with waste of 
kaolin processing + excessive 
release of soot from Imerys. 
Imerys 
June 2007 Drainage of acidic waste from 
kaolin industry into the Curuperê 
and Dendê (Vila do Conde) 
streams, reaching Pará River. 
Imerys 
September 2008 Leakage of fuel oil into the Pará 
River after the sinking of a 
tugboat. 
 
April 2009 Drainage of red mud into the 
Murucupi River. 
Alunorte 
June 2010 Cloud of soot over Industrial 
District. 
 
November 2011 Breakage of a duct with acidic 
waste, reaching the Curuperê and 
Dendê streams (Vila do Conde). 
Imerys 
July 2012 Leakage of kaolin through a 
rupture in the pipeline which 
transports kaolin pulp from Imerys 
(between the port and the plant) 
reaching Maricá streams. 
Imerys 
August 2013 Leakage of kaolin during 
maintenance over Curuperê 
streams (Vila do Conde). 
Imerys 
May 2014 Kaolin leakage from Imerys into 
Curuperê streams (Vila do Conde). 
Imerys 
Table 4: Main environmental accidents in Barcarena 2003-2014 
Sources: IEB, Evandro Chagas Institute and “O Liberal” 
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Most of the accidents were caused by contamination from Alunorte and 
Imerys plants. According to IEB (2012:31) this situation exposes the 
precariousness of the production process, to the extent that industry has not 
developed alternative means for disposing solid and liquid wastes produced by 
their activity while there are no explicit public policies to address the issue.  
However, a legal instrument has been used over the years in Barcarena to 
address damage caused by these accidents. The Conduct Adjustment 
Agreement (CAA, or TAC in Portuguese) is a deal between companies, public 
authorities and other governmental agencies. The main goal is to cope with the 
damages caused by actions or omissions that endanger the environment and/or 
the population of the municipality. It is a mean by which the local justice 
prosecutor (Promotor de Justiça, in Portuguese) can solve environmental 
conflicts without the involvement of the court system.  
CAA is a legal tool similar to a consent decree: “a judgment entered by 
consent of the parties whereby the defendant agrees to stop alleged illegal 
activity without admitting guilt or wrongdoing” (Black 1990). Therefore, it 
makes the legal standard implementation more flexible to the circumstances 
facing the real life events. 
3.8.1 Conduct Adjustment Agreement in Brazil 
In the 1970’s there were precedents of CAA in the Brazilian Legislation of 
pollution control. An example is the Law No. 997 from 31 May 1976, which 
allowed the authority to grant deadlines for polluters to adjust their activities 
respecting environmental limits. In the late 1980’s, after modifications in 
Brazilian legislation arose the need to create and define rules for conduct 
adjustment. The term conduct adjustment agreement was originally mentioned 
by Law No. 8069 from 1990 as a hybrid instrument with effect in the civil, 
criminal and administrative spheres. 
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Later, the article No. 8078 from 1990 expanded CAA applicability when 
admitting public agencies to be in charge of commitments to adjust their 
conduct to legal requirements. In 2001, the Brazilian law authorized members 
from SISNAMA agencies to apply the CAA. SISNAMA are the institutions 
established by governmental agencies responsible for the protection and 
improvement of environmental quality (e.g. Ibama). 
Since then, environmental CAAs have started to be applied in order to induce 
polluters to meet legal environmental requirements, mitigate or remediate 
imminent harm caused to the environment or even solve or prevent conflicts of 
nature that affect environmental licensing of activities or continuity. 
Efficiency in solving environmental conflicts is critical to prevent further 
damage and, in this perspective, the CAA is an effective solution, since they 
also minimise bureaucratic procedures. The agreement involves the legitimate 
public agency (in the case of environmental law, the prosecutor), and the 
polluter agent. It is noteworthy that by accepting the terms of the statement, 
the polluter is not required to assume blame for the damage, it merely accepts 
to pay the charge. The document must contain the conditions, time and place 
for fulfilling the obligation. Plus, it should always take into consideration the 
economic condition of the violator for the purpose of imposing measures that 
suit their enforceability. In addition, the document must include penalties for 
breach of duty, which generally means a daily fine. The application must also 
comply with the obligation to fully recover the damage. If this is not possible, 
the second option is monetary compensation (Tamassia 26/09/2012). 
The formalities and delays that are involved in judicial proceedings undermine 
effective conduct of urgent cases such as environmental accidents. But the 
CAA is also advantageous for the polluter because it can be adapted according 
to their real ability to comply, whereas a judicial decision must be abided by 
regardless of the polluter’s ability to do so. Plus, the polluters avoid the 
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embarrassment of appearing as a defendant in the process, whether it is a civil 
action or criminal process. 
3.8.2 Conduct Adjustment Agreement from 2007 
Unlike previous CAAs in Barcarena, one case in 2007 turned out differently. 
Among the usual compensations, the company responsible for the 
environmental damages was required by the public agency (Ministério Público 
in Portuguese) to finance a capacity building project for local communities as 
one of the obligations of the deal.  
In June, 11th, 2007, kaolin tailings leaked from one of the container basins of 
Imerys Rio Capim Kaolin Company, causing a contamination of nearby 
streams and rivers. In total, 350,000 liters of kaolin waste were dumped in 
Curuperé e Dendê streams, tributaries of Pará River. As a result, 500 families 
living nearby Vila do Conde community were affected. At the end, 52 families 
(196 people) were compelled to temporarily abandon their homes and fishing 
activities were impaired. 
In addition to defining the company’s obligations to compensate the 
environmental and social damage resulting from this accident, Pará Public 
Ministry included the financing of a capacity building program as a strategic 
action to provide resources to finance projects aimed at empowering local civil 
society (IEB 2012).  
The decision was based on the monitoring of the Operational Support Center 
for the Environment (office of the Public Ministry) and dialogue with a range 
of organizations and local leaders. The person primarily responsible for the 
idea was the coordinator of the Center at that time, Raimundo Moraes, who is 
also the former prosecutor of Barcarena from 1993 to 1996 and current 
prosecutor in Belém. “The idea resulted from my experience with the local 
people, also based on the discussion of Habermas concept of the public 
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sphere”7. According to Raimundo Moraes, Barcarena was experiencing a high 
level of disorganization and a low degree of information among local people:  
It took some time to mature this opportunity. Firstly, we had to know 
what the scope of these communities was and their relationship with the 
companies. The accident was a risk but also an opportunity to transcend 
boundaries in the public space (Interview: Moraes 30.10.2014)8.  
As noted by the prosecutor, if compensation should have been divided 
between all those affected by the accident, it would represent a small amount 
of money for each of them individually (less than R$ 500 or US$ 196) but as a 
project it could reach many people. 
Therefore, the agreement was a way to strengthen the political capacity of 
local community and to establish its role in participating on the decision 
making process for the future of Barcarena. The main point was to empower 
the leaders of each community so they could start demanding a stronger 
commitment from companies (to avoid recurring accidents) and from local 
government towards non-compliance to environmental legislation.  
In conclusion, the Conduct Adjustment Agreement paid US$ 180,000 to 
finance the local capacity building project and nominated the Brazilian NGO 
International Institute of Brazilian Education (IEB) to take over the program.  
The decision to invite IEB came from the prosecutor’s previous experience 
with IEB educational program. He had already worked with the NGO in 
Washington, in the year of 1994. At that time IEB was a program of the 
                                              
 
7 The public sphere may be understood as “a discursive space in which individuals and 
groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a 
common judgment”. Source: Hauser, G. (1998), "Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality 
of Public Opinion", Communication Monographs 65(3): 83–107. 
 
8 All interviews in this study were originally in Portuguese and translated to English by the 
author, except the interview with Head of CSR at Hydro Rio de Janeiro, which was in 
English. 
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USAID (The United States Agency for International Development), which 
became the embryo for IEB today. “I have maintained a relationship over the 
years and a partnership. Moreover, there are not many specialized NGOs in 
capacity building in the Amazon, the IEB is the main one”, explained the 
prosecutor. 
In conclusion, Moraes was pleased with the outcome. “CAA cannot change 
everything, but it contributed to many good things”. The prosecutor believes 
that the degree of change was significant and local communities today have 
more information. “The change was positive but it is not finished yet. On the 
other hand, the city government is afraid of losing space and companies are 
afraid of being overpowered”, he asserted. 
3.9 IEB, capacity building and Intersectoral Forum 
IEB is a Brazilian non-governmental organization (NGO) specialized in 
communities of the Brazilian Amazon, in particular Southern Amazonas and 
Pará’s territory. They work with subsistence agriculture, agrarian reform 
settlers and indigenous peoples, as well as environmental professionals and 
students from the private and public sector. The main goal is to educate and 
empower people and strengthen organizations focused on natural resource 
management, environmental and land management and other sustainability-
related topics. IEB operates in network with partnerships and promotes 
interactions and exchanges between civil society, community organizations, 
government institutions and private sector organizations.  
IEB has implemented an agenda based on two central projects in Barcarena: 1) 
one program to strengthen civil society organizations in their ability to 
dialogue with other sectors and 2) one program to support the creation and 
operation of an Intersectoral Forum. This Forum represents a new opportunity 
to local community. It is a dialogue space which gathers in the same room 
local communities’ leaders, municipal government and business sector, mainly 
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represented by Hydro. In other words, the first project is about providing 
training and information and the second project is providing a place to 
dialogue with business and municipal government. 
In 2008, the NGO gathered local communities’ leaderships in training 
activities, including workshops, courses and exchange programs in general 
themes: public budget, corporate social responsibility, public spaces, media 
training, environmental impact, etc. In parallel, IEB moderated negotiations 
between civil society, companies and local government.  
Initially, the program established a network of 120 civil society organizations 
which was then narrowed down to 50 communities. Later, a Monitoring 
Committee composed by 15 leaders of civil society was created. According to 
IEB, one of the concerns since the beginning was to avoid any chance of this 
project to be framed as space of conflict restrains or even a leadership co-
optation space for other purposes. IEB states that the goal of this project is not 
to substitute any other representation as labour union or institution council. It 
is about dialogue and development of collective actions (IEB 2013). 
According to the leaders, the capacity building program is already showing 
results. Local communities managed to stop a project of a thermoelectric 
power plant in Barcarena in 2010, involving a large amount of pollution. 
“During the hearings, the company failed to show or convince us that it would 
be necessary for our city”, explained Rosemiro dos Santos.  
In order to better understand how the work of IEB was designed, the study 
will describe below the summary of the NGO activities in Barcarena from 
2008 to July 2014: 
2008: From March to May, IEB visited local civil society organizations in 
Barcarena in order to introduce the program and convince them to be part of 
the process. In August, the group initiated the planning phase of the 
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institutional strengthening project. The prosecutor presented the Conduct 
Adjustment Agreement (CAA) to 70 local community representatives. 
2009: IEB focused on training workshops, while mapping and identifying 
local civil society groups in Barcarena to create Intersectoral Forum. The main 
seminars topics were: legislation, public spheres, sustainability, fundraising 
for civil society organizations, public budget, CSR, communal communication 
and mining legislation. 
2010: IEB organized exchange experiences to local communities by the 
participation in conferences and social environmental meetings. That was also 
the year when European Commission (executive organization of European 
Union) started financing a continuation project of IEB in order to maintain the 
capacity building activities in Barcarena.  
2011: IEB led the plan to negotiate the integration of business sector in the 
Forum. In parallel, the training program continued. At this stage, there were 
two key facts: Norwegian company Norsk Hydro became the majority 
shareholder of the manufacturers of aluminium in Pará while Norwegian 
Church Aid (NCA) became a partner of the project.  
2012: Integration efforts with business continued but at a slow pace due to 
municipal elections that took priority. Meanwhile there was a consolidation of 
civil society mobilization with the publication of the agenda towards 
Intersectoral Forum, including key challenges. It was also a year of advances 
in business participation. NCA set a meeting in Oslo (Norway) among Hydro 
executive board and a group composed by civil society leaders of Barcarena, 
the prosecutor of Pará, the Norwegian government and IEB representatives to 
discuss the company’s participation on the Intersectoral Forum. “We assumed 
that it was necessary to approach Hydro. They were coming to Barcarena and 
we saw the need to warn the company that we didn’t want another Vale.” (dos 
Santos: interview 15.07.2014). Leader representatives also had a meeting with 
Prio (Peace Research Institute Oslo) in Norway. 
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2013: Hydro officially joined the intersectoral dialogue project in Barcarena. 
The Norwegian company is the largest economic group in the municipality 
and, according to IEB was an essential player to guarantee local government 
commitment in the process. “They came for this dialogue, to contribute and 
build together. In fact they had a very positive participation (as a company) in 
the creation process of the Forum” (Santos: interview 14.07.2014).  
2014: The Forum is officially launched in Barcarena after six years of research 
and planning. The project is composed by an executive commission from the 
civil society, an executive commission from the business sector and an 
executive commission from the local government.  
During the first meeting in 2014, the three groups (civil society, business 
sector and local government) presented their proposals to the city of 
Barcarena. As reported by the final document, each sector introduced their 
plan as will be described below: 
Civil society 
Local people were represented by leaderships of different communities of 
Barcarena. The group proposed a fostering popular participation and social 
control over the performance of the government and the private sector in 
Barcarena, through 1) the creation and/or strengthening of democratic 
institutions and access to public information. They believed that the local 
government and business should encourage 2) the diversification of the 
productive base of the municipality, with special attention to strengthening 
family agriculture and tourism ventures and headed by women and youth. 
Civil society also demanded 3) the creation of mechanisms and strategies that 
enhance the universal access of the population of Barcarena to basic services 
and a healthy environment. 
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Business sector 
The most powerful member of the business sector in the Forum was Hydro. 
Along with local commerce representatives, the business sector demanded 
improvements on 1) public safety in Barcarena, including institutional actions, 
campaigns, educational guidance and the support of social issues;  2) the 
democratization of information, regarding transparency in public management; 
3) human development in capacity management, providing more conditions 
for citizens to grow educationally and have a higher level of political 
consciousness; 4) urban mobility, specially associated with the improvement 
of infrastructure and access to transportation; 5) investments in education, 
encouraging education from the primary school up to labor market and 6) 
business development, business opportunities in agriculture and trade, 
generating employment and foreign exchange.  
Local government 
Represented by the municipal government, this group focused the proposals 
on 1) the presentation the Municipal Government Plan and on 2) opening up 
the participation of all sectors of society in the revision of the Barcarena 
Master Plan (2014-2017). 
3.10 Summary  
This study wants to understand to what extent capacity building and historical 
discontent of society regarding social inequalities and environmental damages 
of industry have contributed to local community leadership claims for changes 
in Barcarena. As will be discussed in chapter Four, the power of business is 
one essential element regarding the debate of local community’s perspective. 
Furthermore, the dynamic of power, legitimacy and urgency attributes of civil 
society are addressed within the Stakeholder identification and salience 
proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997). 
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4. Theoretical framework  
In this chapter, the study will address the power of business regarding social 
and environmental issues worldwide and the role of Corporate Social 
Responsibility since the 1950’s until today. Then, the chapter will discuss 
Stakeholder Theory literature and analyse the identification stakeholder 
diagram of Mitchell et al. (1997) which will be used to analyse the research 
question in chapter Five.  
4.1 Business and sustainability 
Taking into consideration that sustainability is the ability of something to 
sustain itself, a business seeking sustainability ought to cover environment, 
economic and social aspects of its activity impacts. Thus, moving towards 
sustainability is an interdisciplinary challenge for business. According to 
Dunphy (2003:11), the sustainability debate is currently being engaged in 
three levels: intellectual, corporate and consumption. The intellectual level is 
when someone raises the issues of current unsustainable practices and looks 
for solutions. In fact it is the purpose of this study and many others when there 
is the awareness of the considerable challenges of changing these practices. 
The debate reaches the corporate level and influences actions on daily basis of 
members of boards of management, workforce, non-government organizations 
and community. Finally, sustainability is also present in consumption. As 
consumers, society collectively creates patterns of financial rewards that shape 
the economy.  
Many consumers correlate the term sustainability directly to environmental 
impacts of organizations. One of the reasons might be the way organizations 
advertise sustainability in their corporate websites and Public Relations (PR) 
campaigns. It is common to identify environmental symbols like a tree, a leaf, 
a drop of water, and headlines with buzzwords as ‘recycling’ and ‘energy 
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efficiency’. Despite critics against greenwash strategy9, there is still a current 
commitment of organization practices towards the dimension of human 
sustainability. Moreover there is also a growing awareness of internal and 
external social issues, and broader interpretations of the meaning of corporate 
stakeholders.  
Focusing on the corporate level, we can classify actors between internal and 
external agents of sustainability. Internal agents are composed by board 
members, CEOs, executives, managers, supervisor, professionals in staff and 
other members of the workforce.  External agents are represented of 
politicians, investors, consultants, suppliers, financial analysts, social and 
ecological activists, community groups, regulators and consumers.  
Dynamic partnerships between internal agents (e.g. managers), and external 
agents, (e.g. NGOs) are bringing shifts in corporate attitudes and practices. For 
example, the case of the Marine Stewardship Council in 2003 created among 
WWF and Unilever Corporation (UN Compact website, 2014). Moreover 
neighbor agreements are getting more common, in order to develop win-win 
solutions to problems. Corporations are recognizing the growing demand from 
across society for more participatory decision making and accountability. In 
the process, they have learnt the value of strategic alliances and sustainability. 
Notwithstanding, shareholders also demand environmental and social 
responsibility and are using sustainability as a way to measure financial 
success, such as Dow Jones Sustainability. The financial markets are generally 
requiring more information on standards of accountability and the financial 
services industry is under pressure to provide for ethical investments. 
                                              
9 “Used to describe the act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of 
a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service”. Source: Greenpeace 
website (www.greenpeace.org, accessed in 04/11/2014). 
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4.2 Power of business 
It is said that power has shifted from the world of states to the world of 
business (Fuchs and Lederer 2007:2). At the same time, scholars and 
practitioners attribute an increasingly important role in global governance to 
business actors.  The United Nations (UN) Global Compact, for example, was 
created to encourage business to ensure that markets, commerce, technologies 
and finance advance in ways that benefit economies and societies everywhere.  
The idea for a Global Compact was first proposed by UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan in a speech to the World Economic Forum in January 1999. 
Officially launched two years later, it represents the first concerted effort of 
the UN to work with business. The UN Global Compact is a partnership 
between the United Nations, business, international labor and major 
transnational civil society organizations. It is a strategic policy initiative for 
businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with 
ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption:   
 
Human Rights 
1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights;  
2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
Labor 
3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; 
4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor; 
5: the effective abolition of child labor; and 
6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.   
 
Environment 
7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 
8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 
9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. 
Anti-Corruption 
10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery. 
 
Figure 11: The Ten Principles of UN Global Compact 
Source: www.unglobalcompact.org  
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The Global Compact goal was to fill the governance void of the global 
economy and humanize the globalization process. With over 12,000 corporate 
participants and other stakeholders from over 145 countries, it is the largest 
voluntary corporate responsibility institution in the world (UN Global 
Compact 2014). Similarly, many practitioners in national and international 
politics tie the pursuit of sustainability to Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). 
The role of corporations in international environmental politics has changed 
dramatically over the last five decades. During 1960 and 1970 decades, 
environmental and economic objectives appeared to be mutually exclusive, 
and corporate involvement in international environmental politics was limited 
to occasional, and largely reactive, interventions to prevent burdensome 
regulations. In the 1980’s, the corporate sector slowly started to change and a 
growing number of corporations began to integrate environmental objectives 
into their business operations. In the 1990’s, firms were actively promoting 
sustainability goals and seeking to shape the global environmental agenda. 
Corporations also came to involve themselves more actively in other 
environmental negotiations (Falkner 2007:3). 
Accordingly, the market and academia have turned to the concept of global 
‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ to capture the nature of politics in 
today’s globalized world. It cannot be questioned that business in general, and 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in particular, have become a political force 
that has to be taken into account. In fact, literature has repeatedly raised the 
question of the potential power of business regarding their responsibility 
towards issues such as democracy, social justice and sustainable development 
(Levy and Egan 2000, Levy and Newell 2005). 
In order to continue the analysis of business influence, it is necessary to 
discuss the different spheres of power. According to Fuchs and Lederer 
(2007), power is one of the core concepts of political science and yet, it is also 
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one of the most controversial ones. Most political scientists would agree on 
defining power as ‘the ability of A to somehow affect the behavior of B’. 
However, there are three main approaches to look at: instrumental, structural 
and discursive power: 
Instrumentalist approaches have a reference of an actor in the center of a 
relational concept of power based on the direct influence of an actor on 
another actor. Robert Dahl (1957 in Fuchs and Lederer 2007:5) defines it 
when ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that 
B would not otherwise do’. Thus, power is seen as a political actor’s ability to 
achieve results. The concept is often associated with Machiavelli and the 
instrumentalist perspectives have tended to explore how actors influence 
decisions by formal political decision-makers. In business actors, instrumental 
power applies to the act of investing resources to exercise influence in the 
political process, lobbying and financing campaigns. 
Structuralist approaches emphasize the input side of policy and politics and 
the predetermination of the behavioral options of political decision-makers. As 
stated by Peter Bacharach and Morton Baratz (1962 in Fuchs and Lederer 
2007:6-7) power is exercised when ‘A participates in the making of decisions 
that affect B. Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating 
or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit 
the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues 
which are comparatively innocuous to A’. In political science, the notion of an 
agenda-setting power of actors took hold particularly in analyses of actors’ 
influence on negotiations, deriving from their position in institutional 
processes.  However, it is difficult to analyze business structural power 
because it may not ‘leave a trace’. Self-regulation and Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs), represent the exercise of structural power by business.  
Discursive approaches adopt a sociological perspective on power relations in 
society. Power here is seen to be a function of norms, ideas, and societal 
 66 
institutions. It is reflected in discourse, communicative practices, and cultural 
values. Lukes (1974 in Fuchs and Lederer 2007:7) defines it when “A may 
exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but 
he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his 
very wants”. I agree with Fuchs and Lederer (2007) who suggest that it is the 
supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you 
want them to have and at the same time guarantee their compliance by 
controlling their thoughts and desires. Actors strategically use discourse to 
shape norms and ideas, for instance by employing symbols and storylines, and 
by strategically linking issues and actors to establish norms and ideas.  
As an example of the discursive approach, business promotion of consumer 
and entertainment culture also exerts a political influence in the broadest 
sense, as it shapes the public’s attention and desires.  Not surprisingly, 
business actors invest quite heavily in this source of power through image 
campaigns, the sponsoring of entertainment of philanthropic events, and the 
promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship 
discourses.  
Therefore, the power of business has been the reason of a continuing debate 
about the role of corporations in environmental protection. For several years 
now, the core of the debate is based on the argument about whether the 
responsibility of the corporations is simply to create financial wealth for its 
owners or to contribute to the well-being of a wider range of stakeholders, 
including the community, the environment and future generations. 
In environmental reports (IEB 2012), business is often identified as the biggest 
enemy. However, corporations can highly contribute to society and the 
environment. As Dunphy (2003:4) argued, crises faced by humanity can only 
be resolved by the use of coordinated corporate actions. The author mentions 
five key issues pressuring corporations to become more responsible global 
citizens: poverty, inequity (much of the material wealth is owned by the major 
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corporations of the developed world), unbalanced consequences (negative 
effects of globalization and industrialization are largely impacting on the 
developing world and the loss of traditional localized cultures and community 
life), pressure of the global audience (the failure of the international 
community of nations and individuals corporations to address these concerns 
is now a subject of intense interest to an increasingly aware and 
communicative global audience) and, finally, pressure to engage more 
corporate accountability and innovation for sustainability.  
Multinational corporations, particularly those whose reputation is most at risk 
because of their high profile, have started supporting voluntary international 
codes of behavior. Many codes now exist. They include the Ceres Principles 
(www.ceres.org) and the Business Charter for Sustainable Development 
(www.iccwbo.org). Other corporations have taken part in the creation of 
measurement and reporting systems. For instance, the ISO 14000 series for 
systems of Environmental Management (www.iso.org). 
4.3 Corporate Social Responsibility 
There are many definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in a 
growing body of literature. It has become an umbrella term overlapping with 
some conceptions of business-society relations. It has clearly been a dynamic 
phenomenon (Matten and Moon 2008:405), and therefore it is constantly 
bringing new perspectives and applications. 
From decades there is plenty of cross national evidence that CSR varies in 
terms of its underlying meanings and the issues to which it is addressed. After 
reviewing more than 30 years of research on CSR, Bakker et al. (2005) 
concluded that there is no academic consensus on its precise definition. Actors 
outside of the academia - for instance the European Union, the United Nations 
or the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) - 
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usually define Corporate Social Responsibility by referring to other concepts 
such as ‘sustainable development’ or the ‘triple bottom line’.  
One early definition of CSR was proposed by Carroll (1979), who argued that 
CSR encompasses economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that 
society has of organizations at a given point of time. Others such as Frederick 
(1986:4 in Apostolakou 2009:5) later argued that the fundamental idea of 
Corporate Social Responsibility is that business corporations have an 
obligation to work for social improvement. Wood (1991) suggested that 
society has certain expectations for appropriate business behavior and 
outcomes. Other contemporary definitions of CSR reflect a narrowing of the 
term, replacing society by stakeholders that are closer to the company. Bakker 
et al. (2005) argue that CSR reflects societal expectations of corporate 
behavior that is alleged by a stakeholder to be expected by society or morally 
required and is consequently justifiably demanded of a business. CSR invokes 
and overlaps with a number of other concepts used to describe the relationship 
between business and society including corporate social responsiveness, 
corporate social performance and stakeholder management (Apostolakou 
2009:5). 
In order to analyse how the CSR literature has been developed in the 
academia, the authors and definitions will be presented below separated by 
decades: 
The 1950’s:  At first, the term used was often simply Social Responsibility 
(SR). Carroll (1999:269) argued that one possible explanation is because the 
age of the modern corporation’s prominence and dominance in the business 
sector had not yet occurred or been noted. The first publication was the book 
“Social Responsibility of the Businessman” by (considered father of CSR) 
Howard R. Bowen in 1953 that believed that the several hundred largest 
businesses were vital centers of power and decision making and that the 
actions of these firms touched the lives of citizens at many points. In his book, 
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Bowen defined the initial concept of social responsibility of business as 
“obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, 
or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives 
and values of our society” (Bowen 1953:6 in Carroll 1999:270). He also 
quoted a survey from “Fortune” magazine which the editor wrote that CSR, or 
‘social consciousness’ of managers meant that businessmen were responsible 
for the consequences of their actions in a sphere somewhat wider than that 
covered by their profit-and-loss statements.  
The 1960’s: During this decade there was considerable growth in attempts to 
state what CSR means and one important writer of this decade was Keith 
Davis (1969) - whom Carroll believes that should be considered the father of 
CSR. Davis’ definition of social responsibility was “businessmen’s decisions 
and actions taken for reason at least partially beyond the firm’s direct 
economic or technical interest” (Davis 1960:70 in Carroll 1999:271), while he 
explained that it is also a nebulous idea but should be seen in a managerial 
context. Later on, Davis wrote about his views regarding the relation between 
social responsibility and business power: “if social responsibility and power 
were to be relatively equal, then the avoidance of social responsibility leads to 
gradual erosion of social power” (Davis 1960:71). In 1967, Davis revisited his 
concept and wrote “the substance of social responsibility arises from concern 
for the ethical consequences of one’s acts as they might affect the interests of 
others” and that “it moves one larger step further by emphasizing institutional 
actions and their effect on the whole social system. Social responsibility, 
therefore, broadens a person’s view to the total social system” (Davis 1967:46 
in Carroll 1999:272). 
Another contributor was Joseph McGuire with his book “Business and 
Society” (1963:144 in Carroll 1999:272). His definition of social 
responsibility was based on the idea that the corporation has not only 
economic and legal obligations but also certain responsibilities to society 
which extend beyond these obligations. He believed that the corporation must 
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take an interest in politics, in the welfare of the community, in education, in 
the happiness of its employees, and in, fact, in “the whole social world about 
it”. 
In 1967, Clarence C. Walton emphasized two important ingredients of CSR: a 
degree of voluntarism and the acceptance that costs are involved for which it 
may not be possible to gauge any direct measurable economic returns. 
The 1970’s: In 1971, Harold Johnsons wrote that a socially responsible firm is 
one whose managerial staff balances a multiplicity of interests. “Instead of 
striving only for larger profits for its stockholders, a responsible enterprise 
also takes into account employees, suppliers, dealers, local communities, and 
the nation” (Johnsons 1971:50 in Carroll 1999:273). The author believed that 
social responsibility implies that a socially responsible manager is not only 
interested in his/her own well-being but also in the well-being of other 
members of the enterprise and the well-being of his/her fellow citizens. 
Meanwhile, the Committee for Economic Development articulated a three 
concentric circle definition of Social Responsibility: 
 
Figure 12: Diagram definition of Social Responsibility 
Source: Author based on CED 
The inner circle includes basic responsibilities for the efficient execution of 
the economic function (e.g. products, jobs and economic growth). The 
intermediate circle is about responsibilities with a sensitive awareness of 
changing social values and priorities (e.g. concern with environmental 
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conservation and relations with employees). The outer circle outlines 
emerging responsibilities that business should assume to become more 
involved in improving the social environment (i.e. poverty) (CED 1971:15 in 
Carroll 1999:275).  
Another author from the 1970’s was George Steiner, who defended that 
business is and must remain fundamentally an economic institution, however 
it does have responsibilities to help society achieve its basic goals and does, 
therefore, have social responsibilities. The larger a company becomes, the 
greater are these responsibilities, but all companies can assume some share of 
them at no cost and often at a short-run as well as a long-run profit. The 
assumption of social responsibilities is more of an attitude, of the way a 
manager approaches his decision-making process. It is a philosophy that looks 
at the social interest and the enlightened self-interest of business over the long 
run. 
It is the firm’s obligation to evaluate - in its decision-making process - the 
effects of its decisions on the external social system in a manner that will 
accomplish social benefits along with the traditional economic gains which the 
firm seeks. It means that social responsibility begins where the law ends. A 
firm is not being socially responsible if it merely complies with the minimum 
requirements of the law.  
Henry Eilbirt and Robert Parket (1973) referred to it as ‘good neighborliness’, 
saying that social responsibility means the commitment of a business to “an 
active role in the solution of broad social problems, such as racial 
discrimination, pollution, transportation, or urban decay” (Eilbirt and Parket 
1973:7). In 1975, Jules Backman gave some examples, such as employment of 
minority groups, reduction in pollution, greater participation in programs to 
improve the community, improvement of medical care, improvement of 
industrial health and safety – these and other programs designed to improve 
the quality of life. 
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In 1976, H. Gordon Fitch defined CSR in terms of solving social problems. He 
stated that CSR is defined as the serious attempt to solve social problems 
caused entirely or in part by the corporation. 
The 1980’s: During this decade there were fewer definitions, more research, 
and alternative themes such as public policy, business ethics, and stakeholder 
theory & management.  Peter Drucker (1984) also contributed with a 
definition, affirming that: 
The proper social responsibility of business is to tame the dragon, that is 
to turn a social problem into economic opportunity and economic 
benefit, into productive capacity, into human competence, into well-paid 
jobs, and into wealth (Drucker 1984:62 in Carroll 1999:286). 
Furthermore, CSR is defined by most authors and institutions as voluntary 
actions, which “complicates cross-country analysis since the delineation 
between voluntary and mandatory actions depends on the each national legal 
frameworks” (Gjølberg 2009:613). In its very name, CSR presumes corporate 
choices. Yet, it also entails conformance with the law and with customary 
ethics, embedded in ongoing systems of social relations. Given that different 
societies have developed different market systems, reflecting their institutions, 
their customary ethics, and their social relations, it would therefore follow that 
we might expect some differences in the ways in which corporations express 
and pursue their social responsibilities among different societies. 
From 1990’s to present: Crane et al. (2008:3 in Gjølberg 2010) describe the 
rapid growth of CSR since the 1990’s as a ‘unique rise of prominence’ in the 
management literature, due to its ability to attract interest from business, civil 
society, media and government. In a new-institutional perspective it can be 
argued that CSR resembles an ‘institutionalized myth’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977 
in Gjølberg 2010) or a ‘master idea’ in the sense that “CSR provides a widely 
accepted prescription for business-society relations, and is perceived as a 
 73 
natural and an appropriate approach to the problem at hand” (Gjølberg 
2010:205). 
CSR empirically consists of clearly articulated and communicated policies and 
practices of corporations that reflect business responsibilities for some of the 
wider societal good. CSR is therefore differentiated from business fulfilment 
of core profit-making responsibility and from the social responsibilities of 
government (Friedman 1970).  
Gradually, the corporate sector has established global reach and that fact has 
become its most compelling attraction to other social actors. Plus, corporations 
have the ability to make and implement decisions at a pace that neither 
governments nor intergovernmental agencies can possibly match. In the face 
of global governance gaps and governance failures, civil society seeks to 
engage the corporate world’s global platform to advance broader social 
objectives.   
4.3.1 Critics against CSR 
In 1973, Neil Chamberlain concludes that the dream of the socially 
responsible corporation that can transform our society was illusionary. Nearly 
thirty years later, Milton Moskowitz wrote in the “Business Ethics” 15th issue 
that taking into consideration the history of CSR, it has consisted of 95 percent 
rhetoric and five percent action. Other scholars (Laffer in Vogel 2005:12) 
argue that CSR has motivated corporations to take risks and redirected 
management time and financial resources away from the corporation’s core 
economic mission, which is to create wealth for its shareholders.   
However, Vogel (2005:12) argues that more responsible firms are not 
necessarily more profitable, but neither are they less so. Thus, it is possible for 
a firm to commit resources to CSR without becoming less competitive.  
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Furthermore, many corporate executives accept the business case of CSR. 
According to a 2002 survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers, 70 percent of global 
chief executives believe that CSR is vital to their companies’ profitability.  
In addition to that, it is still hard to draw broad conclusions about the 
relationship between CSR and profits because the studies often measure 
different things. In the 95 studies summarized by Margolis and Walsh (in 
Vogel 2005:30), financial performance is measured in 70 different ways: these 
studies employ 49 different accounting measures, 12 different market 
measures, 5 measures that mix accounting and market indicators, and 4 other 
measures of outcome performance. Accounting measures are usually used as 
indications of prior financial performance for studies that seek to explain the 
impact of CSR on financial performance, while market measures are usually 
employed to assess future performance when financial performance is used to 
explain CSR.  
4.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is at the heart of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Corporate Social Responsibility derives from expectations that are external to 
decision-makers (directors and shareholders); it is a response to demands from 
consumers, investors, employees and, more generally, society, that would like 
to see business more effectively integrated into public life. The number and 
intensity of such demands has increased because business policies, particularly 
those of multinationals operating simultaneously in various regions around the 
world, have considerable social, cultural and environmental consequences 
(Bonnafous-Boucher 2010:48). 
In “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach” (1984), R. Edward 
Freeman formulated his first comprehensive theory about the subject. He 
describes the stakeholder concept as enriching the current state of the art in 
strategic management given that the point of strategic management is in some 
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sense to chart a direction for the firm. Groups which can affect that direction 
and its implementation must be considered in the strategic management 
process (Freeman 1984:46).  
Earlier conceptions defined stakeholders as “those groups without whose 
support the organization would cease to exist” (Stanford Research Institute 
1963 in Freeman 1984:31). The first discussions argued that the point of 
understanding the expectations of stakeholders was that without doing so, 
managers could not formulate strategies with which one would obtain the 
support necessary for even the continued survival, let alone competitive 
advantage of the firm. Freeman later attributed stakeholder theory is more 
embedded in the business ethics literature than in the strategic management 
literature. Freeman also worried that CSR might be understood as a separate 
activity from the business operations – when the two should instead be 
considered inseparable (Elms 2011:1-2). 
Recently, a critical issue in the debate has been the virtues of the “neoliberal 
economics” versus “stakeholder capitalism”. Neoliberal economics, led by the 
economist Milton Friedman, argues that the role of the corporation is simply 
to maximize short-term returns to shareholders. Freeman and other theorists 
assert that successful (or even lasting) business must meet stakeholder 
demands for responsible operations. Addressing the tendency to separate 
economic and social effects, Harrison and Freeman (1999:483) refer to the 
distinction as ‘arbitrary’. Indeed, one of the original ideas behind the 
stakeholder management approach was to try to find a way to integrate the 
economic and the social (Harrison and Freeman 1999:483-484).  
4.4.1 Who is a stakeholder? 
In general, researchers working on Stakeholder Theory follow Freeman 
(1999), who provides two definitions, the first “broad”, the second “narrow”. 
The broad definition casts the stakeholder as a person or entity which can 
affect or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives. 
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In the narrow definition, the stakeholder is a person or entity on which the 
organization is dependent for its continued survival. It is generally considered 
that Freeman’s narrow definition is more easily applied in practical situations.  
This study is based on the idea of the broad definition: the fact that the 
company affects directly the wellbeing of the local communities in Barcarena, 
Brazil. The impact started from the moment the factories were constructed. 
Hundreds of workers moved to town in order to build the aluminium complex. 
Moreover, these workers started to live in the neighborhood, begin grocery 
shopping, and driving the local roads (or using public transportation), their 
children started going to the local school, they started paying for electricity 
and water supply (and demand a large system of electricity and water supply), 
paying for taxes and contributing for the pollution of the region. After the 
factories began operating, the industry action affected the local communities 
again because of noise, waste, unemployment (less people were needed 
compared to during construction period), in order to achieve the organization 
goal, which is profit. The local communities (as local stakeholders) also affect 
the organization, especially by its influence on public opinion and political 
sphere. They go to the businesses asking for help (e.g. financial support) and 
they complain if they are not satisfied with the situation. For instance, they go 
to the media to criticize the company actions and that can turn into bigger 
issues for the image of the organization towards public opinion or final 
consumers and consequently impact their sales results.  
Freeman reinforces a ‘name and faces approach’ to firm relations with 
stakeholders, explaining how ‘concrete business problems’ can be solved by 
focusing on individual relationships: 
Stakeholder theory enters in the CSR debate by suggesting that the 
managers of the corporations have a responsibility not simply (and 
vaguely) to serve the general interests of society, but rather to serve the 
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interests of the corporation’s stakeholders (Freeman et al. 2010:260 in 
Elms 2011). 
One of the major tasks of stakeholder theory is not only to identify who 
matters, or who should be considered a stakeholder, but to seek boundary 
constraints defining who might not be considered a stakeholder at all (Mitchell 
et al. 1997). Phillips (2003) elaborates one possible rationale, arguing that 
most claims on the firm by secondary actors (for example, NGOs, unions) 
merely derive from their relationship to other stakeholders with a more direct, 
legitimate claim on the firm (customers, employees). 
4.4.2 Firm-centric stakeholder models  
A traditional stakeholder map (Figure13) first proposed by Freeman (Evan and 
Freeman, 1988:102), places the corporation in the center of the graphic, and 
that remains so in the Freeman, Harrison and Wicks 2007 (Figure 14) more 
complex interaction (Elms 2011:114). Our mental model of corporate 
governance and corporate responsibility is partly constructed from these 
graphics, because effective graphs create or revise our mindset, thus our views 
of the firm, its stakeholders, and its responsibilities. As Yves Fassin notes, a 
single graph can be worth more than a thousand words (Elms 2011:115). 
As it can be noted on Figure 13, the corporation started to look around and 
acknowledged the existence of many groups that are part of them or surround 
them. The manager needs to consider all of the groups’ objectives. In other 
words, the company needs to be concerned about what is happening with 
employees, suppliers, local communities, customers and shareholders. The line 
of reasoning gets more complex in Figure 14, when managers realized that it is 
not just the interest of the previous group relying on their consideration. The 
managers realized that media, NGOs, competitors and government are also 
important. 
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Figure 13: Traditional stakeholder map 
Source: Evan and Freeman (1988:102 in Elms (2011:115) 
 
 
Figure 14: A more complex stakeholder model 
 Source: Freeman, Harrison, and Wicks (2007:51) in Elms (2011:115) 
 
The two diagrams show us that there are many ways of connecting 
stakeholders and classifying them. This study will further define what 
identification will be used in the case. However, it is valid to be aware of the 
plurality and dynamic of stakeholders.  
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4.4.3 Stakeholder Identification and Salience 
Mitchell et al. (1997:853) generated a typology of stakeholders concerning 
their salience to managers of the firm, which is the degree to which managers 
give priority to competing stakeholder claims, and management implications. 
Based on the work of Freeman (1984), they claim that there is no agreement 
on what he calls The Principle of Who or What Really Counts and there is a 
need for a theory of identification that can separate stakeholders from non-
stakeholders. Therefore the proposition calls for a normative theory of 
stakeholder identification to explain logically why managers should consider 
certain classes of entities as stakeholders and question the stakeholder 
salience. 
In stakeholder literature there are many definitions, such as primary and 
secondary, owners and non-owners of the firm, as resource providers and 
dependents of the firm, as risk-takers and influencers, etc. Also there are a 
number of narrow definitions that attempt to specify the pragmatic reality that 
managers simply cannot attend to all actual or potential claims, and then 
propose priorities for managerial attention.  
The identification concept started with a broad definition based on Freeman 
regarding “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman 1984:46) so that no 
stakeholders are excluded from analysis. Then, it proposed that classes of 
stakeholders can be identified by their possession or attributed possession of 
one, two, or all three of the following attributes:  1) the stakeholder’s power to 
influence the firm, 2) the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the 
firm, and 3) the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm. In the end, the 
variables define to whom managers should pay attention. 
Furthermore, the authors (Mitchell et al. 1997:855) suggested a dynamic 
model that helps to explain how managers prioritize stakeholders’ 
relationships. Knowing what types of stakeholders actually exist, and why 
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managers respond to them the way they do, the typology sets the stage for 
future work in stakeholder theory that specifies how and under what 
circumstances managers can and should respond to various stakeholder types. 
In conclusion, stakeholder identification shows how power and legitimacy 
interact and, when combined with urgency, create different types of 
stakeholders and this has implications for the expected behavioral patterns 
regarding the firm. The definition of stakeholder attributes being: 
Power to influence the business 
According to Weber (1947), power is “the probability that one actor within a 
social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance”. While Pfeffer rephrases Dahl’s (1957) definition of power as “a 
relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another 
social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done” 
(Pfeffer 1981:3 in Mitchell et al. 1997:865). The authors noted however that 
power is transitory: it can be acquired as well as lost (Mitchell et al.1997: 865-
866). 
Legitimacy relationship with the firm 
The authors accept Weber’s (1947) proposal that legitimacy and power are 
distinct attributes that can combine to create authority (defined by Weber as 
the legitimate use of power) but that can exist independently as well. Suchman 
(1995) defined legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995:574). The 
authors (Mitchell et al. 1997:867) reminded that legitimacy “is attained in a 
system with multiple levels of analysis such as individual, organizational and 
societal. The definition implies that legitimacy is a desirable social good, that 
it is something larger and more shared than a mere self-perception, and that it 
may be defined and negotiated differently at various levels of social 
organization.  
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Urgency of claims on the firm 
The model proposes that adding the stakeholder attribute of urgency helps 
move the model from static to dynamic. Urgency is defined by the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary as ‘calling for immediate attention’ or ‘pressing’. Urgency 
is based on 1) time sensitivity – the degree to which managerial delay in 
attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder, and 2) 
criticality – the importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder. 
It defines urgency as the degree to which stakeholder claims call for 
immediate attention. 
According to Mitchell et al. (1997:875) identification, areas 1, 2, and 3 are 
called ‘latent stakeholders’, which are identified by their possession or 
attributed possession of only one of the attributes. The following areas 4, 5 
and 6 are ‘expectant stakeholders’ identified by their possession or attributed 
possession of two of the attributes. Finally, the combination of all three 
attributes is the defining feature of highly salient stakeholders in area 7, the 
‘definitive stakeholder’. According to this model, entities with no power, 
legitimacy, or urgency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders.  
 
 
Figure 15: Stakeholder identification 
Source: Mitchell et al. 1997:874 
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Thus, local communities in this study are classified previously as ‘dependent 
stakeholders’ moving forward to a definitive’ stakeholder’s position. The 
chapter Five will analyze that dynamic perspective proposal. 
Dependent stakeholders are the group who lack power but who have urgent 
legitimate claims as "dependent," because these stakeholders depend upon 
others for the power necessary to carry out their will (Mitchell et al. 
1997:877). The authors explained that since power in this relationship is not 
reciprocal, its exercise is governed either through the advocacy or 
guardianship of other stakeholders, or through the guidance of internal 
management values (Mitchell et al. 1997:877). The case of oil spill from the 
Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound (Alaska) on March 1989 is used as an 
example of dependent stakeholder identification: “We can show that several 
stakeholder groups had urgent and legitimate claims, but they had little or no 
power to enforce their will in the relationship” (Mitchell et al. 1997:877). In 
this case, stakeholders groups such as local residents had to rely on the support 
of more powerful and dominant stakeholders for the claims to be satisfied.  
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5. Analysis 
In this chapter, the study will discuss to what extent local communities in 
Barcarena had power and legitimacy towards the aluminium industry and to 
what extent was there a matter of urgency, according to the theoretical 
framework, on chapter Four. In order to understand the dynamic status of local 
communities regarding the business, this chapter will analyze the relationship 
between local people and the industry in two different periods: the first one 
from 1980 to 2011, when Brazilian Vale was in charge of the aluminium 
production chain. The second period is from 2011 to July 2014, when the 
Norwegian ownership of the industry complex in Barcarena took place until 
my fieldwork in Pará. 
5.1 Local communities as stakeholders (1980-2011) 
Local communities’ representatives, when asked to describe Vale in words, 
chose expressions as “bureaucratic”, “insensitive” and “arrogant”. Such blunt 
answers are often used to express their first experience as stakeholders of the 
industry in Barcarena in the 1980’s. The Vale administration years started with 
the construction of aluminium complex in Barcarena and lasted until 2011. It 
was characterized by a lack of transparency from Vale and local government, 
discontent from local people and occasional charity social projects.  
According to the stakeholder identification diagram (Mitchell et al. 1997) the 
first attribute of the local communities to be discussed is legitimacy. The 
definition of legitimacy used by the stakeholder identification is the one 
described by Suchman (1995:574) as a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.  
During the first period of time, the relationship of the local community with 
business was identified as legitimate due to the fact that they are the people 
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living in the territory which was “invaded” by the aluminium complex in the 
1980’s. That means that people’s culture and history are embedded to that 
land. Therefore, local communities have been playing a legitimate role as a 
stakeholder of the aluminium production chain since the beginning of the 
construction of the complex in Barcarena. 
The second attribute to analyse is stakeholder’s urgency. Urgency is the 
degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention and is based 
on two concepts: time sensitivity and criticality. Over the years, local 
community has faced time sensibility regarding environmental and social 
perspectives in Barcarena. One main issue is the pollution that the industry 
activities produce. If the industry continues to pollute, local people will get 
sick or will be forced to move to other regions. According to interviews, waste 
management is one of the biggest environmental ‘time-sensitivity-urgency’ 
problems to local communities in Barcarena. As stated by Rosemiro dos 
Santos, the challenge today is to fight inequality concerning environmental 
issues. Community leader Walmir Souza suggested that Alunorte should treat 
the waste of alumina operations, considering that 50 percent of each ton of 
bauxite is waste and it is placed in pools in the factory. According to him, 
academics at Federal University of Pará currently study the subject and they 
recommend using the waste for making ceramic material, like brick. The cost 
of a thousand bricks today is R$ 240 and with this new process it would go up 
to R$ 500. But there are arguments that defend that the environmental gain 
justifies the higher cost. “My point is, these expenses with technology should 
have been already included in the project cost of the plant from the first place” 
(Souza: interview 15.07.2014). 
In the social perspective, time also matters to local people when demanding 
job opportunities. Back in the 1980’s the construction displacements and 
pollution has affected the local production of agriculture and fish and the 
community had no alternative but to start working in the industry. However, 
they did not have technical training and were often unemployed. In that case, 
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poverty increased and thus local people could have fallen in a life of crime, 
drugs and prostitution. Community leader Cleide Monteiro mentioned many 
times how frustrating it is to watch workers from other cities or even states of 
Brazil moving to Barcarena with better curricula and taking job vacancies 
while people from her community are still unemployed. Leader Angela 
Santiago concluded that the community needs many things, especially 
technical training. In fact, during the fieldwork it was common to see 20-30 
year-old men sitting in the porch or chatting in the city squares during working 
hours. Angela asserts that today young people drop out of school at eighth 
grade because “they don’t see the point”. As noted by her, no one in the 
community works at a manager-level position at the company; it is generally 
workers from out of town, usually from Belém or São Paulo. “There are only 
cleaning, cooking or basic contractor jobs left for us. A technical course costs 
R$ 300 (US$ 115) and it makes it difficult for an unemployed person to pay 
the fee”. According to the community leader the company should look inside 
the community since there is no one who better understands the reality than 
the people in the community” (Santiago: interview 16.07.2014). 
Regarding the concept of criticality in urgency, it should not be ignored that 
local community’s issues are mainly talking about human lives. There are 
families living next to the industry and in case of environmental damage and 
no job opportunities, this group will be forced to move Barcarena, and perhaps 
repeat the same situation somewhere else, where they may face new problems 
such as being the outsider (and then less legitimacy attribute). 
The third and last stakeholder attribute to discuss is power to influence the 
business. According to the analysis based on stakeholder identification and 
salience to business, local communities’ power to influence business was 
almost inexistent for the last 30 years in Barcarena. This study concludes that 
the geographic isolation of the aluminium complex played an important role 
for the understanding of power of business until 2011. The isolation from 
financial centers in the Brazilian Southeast region benefits the business’s goal 
 86 
for profit at the expense of local communities’ rights. Barcarena is 2,000 km 
away from big cities such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and that makes it 
difficult to bring attention of the national media, which can be one of the 
strongest tools against unethical business and corruptive governments. The 
distance and lack of media coverage from the countryside of Brazil kept the 
information away from opinion leaders. Along with media, opinion leaders 
can be the voice to local people claims regarding social issues and 
environmental damage caused by industry, for example. With the help of these 
two channels, local communities can influence the opinion of shareholders and 
customers and, consequently have the power of influencing the business. 
Another setback was the limited academic and technical education level of 
local people in Barcarena. They were represented by agriculture workers, 
fishermen, indigenous people and housewives who did not know much about 
legislation, sustainability terms and corporate vocabulary so then they were 
not able to demand their rights.  
However, by the time Hydro took over the production chain in Barcarena, 
people were confident to express what they wanted from the industry. After 
the first years of capacity building they concluded that they wanted more 
power as local stakeholders as well as more transparency from industry in 
Barcarena. “We wanted to be included”, said Petrolino Alves.  The majority of 
the leaderships assumed that transparency is the key point for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. They wanted to be real stakeholders of the industry and be part 
of the decision making process in order to guarantee their demands. The main 
purpose was to be taken seriously after historically being ignored while the 
government and industry were negotiating what would and did impact the 
wellbeing of all Barcarena. “Sustainable development is when everyone sees 
the development. What about the rest of the population who is breathing this 
air?” (Alves: interview 17.07.2014). 
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5.2 Local communities as stakeholders (2011-2014) 
The second part of the analysis of local communities as stakeholders takes into 
account the period from the start of Hydro administration in 2011 until the end 
of the fieldtrip, which was on July 2014. Once again, I asked local 
communities to describe their relationship with the business, in this case 
Hydro, and they used the following expressions: “more open”, “opportunity to 
change” and “positive expectations”. At this time, the descriptions were not 
about pointing fingers to the alleged enemy. Local communities used 
sentences which expressed a relational perspective, including their active role 
in the relationship.  Thus, it is possible to identify a change in the relationship 
with the business as stakeholders of the company. It is suggesting a dynamic 
role of local communities in Barcarena moving forward a more representative 
stakeholder status. 
According to the three attributes of the stakeholder identification diagram 
(Mitchel et al. 1997), legitimacy and urgency of local communities are 
identified as the same position as in the analysis of first part (from 1980’s to 
2011 as discussed in 5.1). However, the study recognizes that the attribute of 
power of influence has changed over the last three years. Local communities 
have gained an increased power of influence the business. The main reasons 
being the intervention of the local prosecutor (which lead to capacity 
building), the shift from Vale to Hydro and the discontentment of local people.  
The first step was the prosecutor’s decision of breaking the historical cycle of 
short term solutions after environmental accidents by industry, such as 
charities compensation for local communities. In 2007, he ordered investments 
on capacity building of local people and invited the Brazilian NGO IEB to 
take over the project. IEB held seminars and workshops to teach local people 
about environmental impacts, legislation and corporate responsibility. Local 
people then empowered themselves and became better informed of the 
technical terms of industry activities, how the law can be applied to their 
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benefit and how to communicate in the corporate environment. That 
knowledge became an instrument of local communities’ power to influence 
the company as a stakeholder.  
The second step happened when Hydro became the major shareholder of the 
aluminium complex in Barcarena. To some it merely meant a symbolic 
change, to others it was indeed about a different CSR strategy. Nevertheless, 
the shift represented the favorable scenario for a brand new start of 
relationship between local communities and the industry. That created an 
opportunity for local people to express clearly their concern with social and 
environmental issues in town. 
The third step was the discontentment of the people and the will to not go back 
to the position where they came from. Now local communities have the 
knowledge and the opportunity to use that information, and most of all, they 
are better organized and determined to go forward and build a new 
relationship as stakeholders in Barcarena. 
Therefore a dynamic process happened in this case study: local communities 
initially positioned as ‘dependent’ stakeholders are moving in direction of a 
‘definitive’ stakeholder status.  According to the diagram area 6 (‘dependent 
stakeholder’) is the group that has urgent legitimate claims while depending 
upon others for the power necessary to carry out their will. The combination of 
all three attributes is the defining feature of highly salient stakeholders in area 
7 (‘definitive stakeholder’). 
This thesis claims that Barcarena communities are moving towards a more 
powerful status as local stakeholders. In other words, local communities are 
broadening their role in Barcarena’s social political economic sphere. They 
want to fill a more powerful position and a new degree of influence. Thus, 
with the help of instruments such as the capacity building workshops and the 
Intersectoral Forum, civil society aims at getting more transparency from 
business activities and  becoming more active players in the diagram, with 
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more power bargaining inside the decision making process of the industry and 
the local government. 
5.3 The awakening of civil society 
When this study mentions local communities, it means people living in the 
municipality of Barcarena, state of Pará. Some of them are engaged for years 
in the industry impacts in the region and some groups have just recently joined 
the process. In the beginning of the mapping research by NGO IEB, there 
were 120 civil society organizations. Over the planning of the capacity 
building program the number of participants was reduced to 70 groups and 
currently, the network is composed by 50 local communities. There are 
community centers, labor unions and groups of people living next to the plants 
represented by teachers, housewives, retired politicians, religious leaders and 
indigenous people, for example. At different degrees, the only thing binding 
them is the aluminium industry impacts in their lives. “We (local 
communities) get along. I believe we have more or less the same motivation. 
This is our reality, so we must fight, and fight for the new generation”, 
concluded community leader of Vila Nova Itupanema, Angela Santiago 
(Santiago: interview 16.07.2014). 
During the first interview approach, the storytelling of a quiet town is their 
favorite part. They are clearly very happy and nostalgic when describing 
things that they have lost since the new industrial reality of Barcarena was 
established: the Pineapple Festival, the wild nature, the rich trees of açaí and 
pupunha and the safety feeling among parents taking their children to school. 
Another unanimity amongst locals is their positive expectations towards the 
Norwegian management of the two biggest businesses in town, Alunorte and 
Albras (alumina and aluminium plants). That can mean two things: number 
one is that they had a negative experience with the previous Brazilian 
company Vale and they see Norwegian Hydro as a “beacon of hope” or 
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number two, that they are convinced that the new business will be more 
responsible, either due to a genuine CSR approach by managers or to high 
standards of CSR in Scandinavian countries.  
After the shifting of the companies in 2011, Hydro has started a process of 
rapprochement with local communities focusing in the importance of 
transparency. In order to avoid suspicious from civil society, the company 
opened their doors to leadership visits and launched a newsletter focused on 
this group to report social and environmental programs related to their 
economic activities.  
In addition to that, Hydro is the only major business taking part of the Forum, 
which represents a big step in the process. Even though the environmental 
damage in 2007 (which resulted in the compliance agreement) was attributed 
to another company (Imerys Kaolin), Hydro is in fact the only business 
representative in the Intersectoral Forum. IEB had shown a concern that 
perhaps they are participating too much in a way. Opening a discussion if 
Hydro genuine interest to join the Forum was to have more control and power 
over the situation. Although it is a risk to take, the plan of IEB is to convince 
other companies operating in Barcarena to join the Forum and increase the 
efforts to find a stronger debate about the future of Barcarena. 
According to leaderships, one of the main previous issues dealing with 
companies was the bureaucratic relationship that they felt forced to accept. 
Plus, the technical vocabulary and the complicated words that were used to 
present arguments brought a feeling of insecurity among many local people. 
They felt inferior, vulnerable and frustrated. Taking into consideration that 
most of them do not have a High School degree, it is an unfair relationship for 
business to expect that local people would fully understand environmental 
impact reports on their own. Regarding IEB, all of the leaderships interviewed 
were positively impressed by the work of the Brazilian NGO in Barcarena. 
Firstly with the capacity building program and then with the Forum. Most of 
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the leaders explained proudly what they had learned in the lectures and 
workshops by describing that they are already applying the knowledge in their 
relationships with the companies.  
Nevertheless, they do not give all the credits for IEB. At many times, 
community leaders attested the success of the capacity building to their own 
effort of taking this chance and making it an opportunity to improve their 
knowledge. Furthermore, that brings a new power relation in the picture: not 
all people from the local communities had the chance to participate in the 
capacity building process. Each community chose or elected a leader and this 
leader was the one who participated in the workshops and teaching classes. 
Nevertheless, this power relation between the leader and the rest of the 
community group can go to two opposite directions: the first one happens if 
the leadership share his/her knowledge with the rest of the group in order to 
spread capacity building achievements amongst all; the second one occurs if 
the leader centralizes the ‘power of knowledge’ for his/her own benefit: 
After we started this training, we became a little more prepared, of 
course. Because we have questioned the companies but did not have that 
foundation of how to claim certain things and then companies saw us as 
we were begging. On the other hand, there is always someone who wants 
to take advantage to himself, right? In a big group of people there are 
always those who want to take advantage (dos Santos: interview 
15.07.2014). 
The secretary of Urban Planning in Barcarena reminded that all conduct 
adjustment instruments reflect a pre-existing condition and the best scenario 
would be the one that actually does not require the use of such an instrument. 
However, he believes that the decision to apply resources from CAA in the 
training of social leaders for the relationship with business and government 
was a great solution to improve dialogue. "It is important to bring business, 
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civil society and government to act together, especially to prevent new impacts 
of the economic activities". 
According to Walmir de Souza, local communities asked for basic training on 
environmental laws to understand their rights. Plus, a seminar about public 
budget. “Basically we wanted to have control over public forces. Another 
issue is communication: we wanted to learn how to communicate with these 
people” (Souza: interview 15.07.2014). 
Leaderships mentioned the beginning of a new respect relationship, which can 
be evaluated as new changing power relations between the company managers 
and the community. “Nowadays there is this two-way dialogue. Since the start 
of the Forum, local community is demanding responsibility because now the 
civil society has awakened”, stated Petrolino Alves. Rosemiro concluded that 
“managers already see us with a little more respect. Now the new generation 
needs to keep up the work” (dos Santos: interview 15.07.2014). 
Moreover, communities’ representatives explained they understand that 
charity is not the key to a long-term social and environmental change in 
Barcarena. Handing out food is not changing their future as groups living in 
the neighborhood. They expect from the industry more transparency with 
environmental impacts, such as efficient technology to avoid environmental 
accidents. The local people want technical training for youth to join the market 
and keep distance from drugs.  They want to feel part of the progress and not 
only the vulnerable audience. For instance, better jobs would lead to better 
political consciousness, which would lead to better education standards, better 
public transportation so the kids can go to school and the parents go to work, 
better healthcare and better wellbeing for Barcarena. Not forgetting the huge 
potential for generating positive social spillover effects: the adoption of good 
practices by major firms such as Hydro may exert an upward pull on the 
performance of local enterprises in the same sector (Ruggie 2003:16-18). 
Consequently, if Hydro’s relationship with local communities succeeds, there 
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is a greater chance that other companies in town will be pressured to follow 
the same example. 
As reported by IEB, the capacity building process is almost finished. “I would 
say we are in stage 8 of 10”, said project assistant Rita de Cássia. The Forum 
program will continue until all three groups are willing to build a common 
future for Barcarena: 
You realize that it is already paying off when you hear a leadership 
saying that not all problems are the responsibility of companies. Before, 
this same person used to organize strikes and block the industry gates. 
Now they want to discuss the problems (Santos: interview 14.07.2014). 
Local government believes that the closer the entrepreneurial sector is from 
the social agents the better will be the relationship. "The participation of 
Hydro was decisive to the implementation of Intersectoral Forum" says the 
Secretary. 
In addition to that, what is unique about this case study is the unexpected 
initiative from the business demanding the local government presence in the 
Forum. Usually, it is the other way around, when local government brings the 
business to commit them in guaranteeing their responsibilities with the local 
communities. According to the communities’ perspective, municipal 
government is absent regarding health care, security, public transportation, 
education and infra-structure. It is also not effective in regards to investing 
taxes paid by the industry in improvements in the municipality. One called the 
struggling relationship a ‘ping-pong game’ when company says it is paying 
the taxes accordingly and local government blames business for social and 
environmental problems. Recently, the municipal government signed their 
commitment to join the Forum, and is officially attending the meetings and 
partially financing it. However, many of the interviewees declared that local 
government is not demonstrating as much effort during the decision making 
plans as is Hydro. 
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To community leader Angela Monteiro, Hydro has already started showing 
more respect towards local people’s demands. “Hydro realized that we are 
more aware of what is going on and that our proposal is collective. It is a long 
way, but we are moving forward” (Monteiro: interview 17.07.2014). 
Head of CSR in Hydro Barcarena, Elena Brito approves the empowerment of 
local communities facing local government and asserts that the Forum has 
been very productive. “Now communities know how to demand their rights if 
the local government is not doing their job. Meanwhile, we will be trying to 
help in any way possible until the political power is structured” (Brito: 
interview 16.07.2014). 
Project leader of NCA is sceptical about the future challenges on building a 
dialogue with civil society in a place like Barcarena, while economy is strong 
and local people are weak. However, Dale asserts that Hydro role inside the 
Forum can make a difference. “I have a positive expectation about the 
presence of Hydro in the Forum. It is an incredible impact and that is when our 
dream reality starts”. Moreover, the NGO alerts that there is a need for 
constant training new leaders and maintain the idea alive.  
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to understand why local communities seem to 
be gaining more power to influence Hydro’s aluminium production chain in 
Barcarena. My aim throughout the thesis was to examine how social 
inequalities, environmental damages, capacity building and the shift of the 
industry ownership from Brazilian Vale to Norwegian Hydro had moved local 
communities forward to gain more power as stakeholders. 
The fieldwork in Barcarena was essential to get primary and secondary data 
about local communities. After literature research and 20 interviews, including 
elite interviews with Hydro and semi structure interviews with local leaders, it 
was clear to conclude that local communities demand changes.  
As stakeholders, local people want more power to influence the business. 
They want the business taking communities into account instead of excluding 
them from the development process. Communities did not approve the 
industry presence in the 1980’s and prefer living the “simple life” (agriculture 
and fishing). They believed the aluminium complex is not sustainable, both 
environmentally and socially. There have been 13 environmental accidents in 
Barcarena since 2003 plus there is an inequality scenario between profits of 
the industry and social wellbeing (health services, public transport, lack of 
jobs and housing policies). One thing everyone agrees with is that local 
communities were not prepared for the industry activities and the 
consequences. It was their first experience dealing with a big corporation and 
the communities claim they felt intimidated and did not have enough 
knowledge (about industry, about the impact in Barcarena, about their rights 
as local communities). 
According to all informants, capacity building gave local communities the most 
powerful tool: information. Now they know what their demands are and want 
to be part of the future making of Barcarena. Local communities claim that 
business has the responsibility to take care of what and where their industrial 
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activities are impacting. Indeed the business has changed Barcarena’s wellbeing 
and leaders express their dissatisfaction saying that at least the industry should 
offer jobs for community people and should spend more technology 
(investments) in avoiding environmental accidents and finally, should be more 
transparent. 
The local people also complain about municipal government. As regulator and 
inducer of development, the government should protect not only economic 
interests but, mainly, life. Pointed by many actors as absent in dealing with the 
social problems in Barcarena, the municipal government is reluctant to admit 
it. Despite that, it recognizes the role of the capacity building and the 
Intersectoral Forum as two important instruments for Barcarena and approves 
the first decisions made by Hydro. 
Therefore, this study is a case of local communities struggling their way out of 
an absent government and relying on their role as stakeholder to increase their 
power to influence the business and protect their rights.  
The analysis was divided in two parts: the first one is from 1970’s until 2011, 
when Brazilian Vale was the main shareholder of the aluminium complex. The 
second part is represented by the period from 2011 and 2014, when Hydro 
bought the majority of shares from Vale until the end of my fieldwork. As 
explained in chapter Five, the study claims that local communities in 
Barcarena are moving towards the center of the diagram, which means that 
they are assuming a more powerful stakeholder position. In the first part, local 
communities are identified as entitled to legitimacy and urgency. However, the 
group did not have power to influence the business. In sum, local people from 
Barcarena were not organized and did not know about legislation, 
sustainability terms, and corporate vocabulary so as to be able to demand their 
rights. In the second evaluation, the study argues that local communities have 
gained more power to influence business due to historical discontent with 
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social economic and environmental situation in Barcarena, capacity building 
process and the creation of the Intersectoral Forum. 
The study also concludes that Brazilian Vale had a very negative reputation 
but local people had a positive expectation from Norwegian Hydro. One of the 
reasons for that expectation was the football team sponsored by Hydro since 
1999.  Being Norwegian was not only positive for local communities’ 
expectations, but also brought the attention of Norwegian NGO NCA as an 
additional watchdog. NCA started acting in Barcarena after Hydro became the 
main shareholder of the complex and it is still present in the town. 
The question that still stands is how Barcarena will be in the next ten years. 
Will local community be an influential stakeholder of the future of business in 
town? Will NGOs IEB and NCA be active in the support of local communities 
toward challenges? And will the municipal government improve social 
conditions in Barcarena and demand responsible conduct from business? 
There is a chance that efforts for an open dialogue lose strength and 
occasionally fail over time, especially taking into account that there will be a 
new municipality election in October 2016. Plus, if fundraising is 
compromised, both the capacity building program and Intersectoral Forum 
could be over. The future of the status of local communities as powerful 
stakeholder then lies on the local communities themselves. 
Regardless of what would the outcome of local communities in Barcarena be, 
this case study can contribute to further understanding of local people 
perspective towards business in developing countries. As mentioned in chapter 
Four, there has been a rapid growth of interest in CSR both in management 
literature and the market itself due to its ability to attract interest from 
business, civil society, media and government. However, there seems to be 
little understanding of the role of local communities as stakeholders. During 
the literature analysis, there were rare examples of research regarding local 
people’s power to influence the corporation. This lack of focus on local 
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stakeholders is a sign of concern. At the present time, the corporate sector has 
global reach which complicates cross-country analysis since the delineation 
between voluntary and mandatory actions of business depends on each 
national legal framework. In other words, the difference between welfare and 
business responsibility in Norway might not be the same as Brazilian Amazon 
perspective. In conclusion, the understanding of the role of local communities 
as stakeholders can much contribute to improve CSR projects and, equally 
important, to the sustainable development in developing countries which are 
often land of an extractive economy. 
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